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Abstract
Malicious executable code is nothing new. While many consider that the concept of
malicious code began in the 1980s when the first PC viruses began to emerge, the
concept does in fact date back even earlier. Throughout the history of malicious
code, methods of hostile code delivery have mirrored prevailing patterns of code
distribution. In the 1980s, file infecting and boot sector viruses were common,
mirroring the fact that during this time, executable code was commonly transferred
via floppy disks. Since the 1990s email has been a major vector for malicious code
attacks. Again, this mirrors the fact that during this period of time email has been a
common means of sharing code and documents.

This thesis examines another model of executable code distribution. It considers the
security risks involved with the use of executable code embedded or attached to
World Wide Web pages.

In particular,. two technologies are examined.

Sun

Microsystems' Java Programming Language and Microsoft's ActiveX Control
Architecture are both technologies that can be used to connect executable program
code to World Wide Web pages. This thesis examines the architectures on which
these technologies are based, as well as tl1e security and trust models that they
implem~nt. In doing ~o, this thesis aims .to assess the level of risk posed by such
technologies and to highiig..'1t simil;:11 risks that might occur with similar future
technologies.
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1. Introduction and Scope

9

1.1. Introduction
The idea of malicious program code is as old as modem computers themselves. In
1949, John von Neumann's "A self reproducing program in Theory and Organization
of Complicated Automata" (cited in McMullin, 2000) proposed the idea that a

computer program could reproduce itself.
When Fred Cohen began researching the idea of programs that replicate by inserting
code into other programs in 1983 the idea of the Computer Virus was born. While
vifus..like code such as 11Elk Cloner" (Skrenta, n.d) bad earlier appeared on Apple II
systems, Fred Cohen's work led to the coining and definition of the term Computer
Virus. Cohen defin~d a virus as " ... a program that can 'infect' other programs by

modifying them to include a possibly evolved copy of itself' (Cohen, 1984).
In 1988 the Morris Wonn (CERT,1997) spread around the Internet with frightening
speed. While not the first code of its type, the Morris Worm demonstrated the

vulnerability of connected systems to a rapidly spreading attack

The Back Orifice Trojan, released by the Cult of the Dead Cow (cDc) in 1998
(CERT, 19981 received a significant amount of attention. Trojans such as B02K

can grant an attacker almost total control of a victim's machines. While other client~
server Trojans such as Netbus provided similar capabilities, Back Orifice still
remains one of the most high profile and most dangerous of Trojar..s. Its current
form, known as B02K is one of the most notable of current Trojans.

Since the 1980s, malicious code has been part of the computer security landscape hut
this landscape is changing. It is interesting to note that recent years have seen
somewhat of a blurring between some of these types of malicious code. In particular
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the distinction between viruses and wonns has narrowed. For example, some articles
refer to Melissa as an example of a wonn (Sophos Anti-Virus, 2002), others refer to
it as a virus (CERT, 1999b) while others refer to it as a hybrid that exhibits the
characteristics of both a virus and a worm (Nachenberg, n.d). While CERT refers to
Melissa as virus rather than a worm, due to its reliance on human interaction in order
to spread, it does acknowledge that the level of hwnan interaction required is
minimal (CERT, 1999b). Likewise the Loveletter Worm is also sometimes referred
to as a virus (Microsoft, 2002a).

Increasingly email is becoming the major vector for such wonns and viruses.
However, new technologies such as various fonns of executable web content may
play an important role in this changing landscape of malicious code. Email has a
nwnber of characteristics that makes it an attractive to writers of malicious code as
an infection vector.

The ubiquitous availability of email allows an attacker

potentially affect vast numbers of systems. As a form of personal communication,
email allows an attacker opportunities to make use of social engineering techniques
to spread malicious code. Finally the lack of intrinsic, integrated security controls
means that there are many avenues of attack that can be exploited by the writers of
malicious code.
This thesis examines the possibilities for malicious code being implemented using
executable web content technologies such as Java and ActiveX. Both Java and
Active allow executable code to be embedded within a web page and executed on
client machines when that page is viewed. While this can help web developers to
create increasingly dynamic and engaging web pages, the fact that untrusted,
possibly malicious code is being executed raises a number of security concerns. The
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architectures of Java and ActiveX will be examined along with the security
functionality that they provide.
The addition of executable code to web pages raises several new concerns. This
code has a different model of distnbution to other fonns of software. With this new
model of distribution comes a range of new security issues. Such code has the ability
to affect confidentiality of infonnation, integrity of data, software and operating
systems as well as the availability of systems and services. There are also a number
of issues related to the authenticity of such code and the ability of people to deny
developing malicious code.
This thesis will argue that while operating system and web application levels security
mechanisms are an important layer of defence, executable web content technologies
need to implement their own trust and security architectures.

1.2. Scope of Thesis
While the risks facing users of the World Wide Web are many and varied, this thesis
is quite specific in its scope. It focuses solely on the risks to World Wide Web users
posed by malicious executable web content.

In particular it focuses on Sun

Microsystems' Java programming language and Microsoft's ActiveX technology.
While interpreted forms of executable web content including scripting languages do
raise certain security concerns, this thesis limits its scope to binary fonns of
executable web content.
This thesis discusses the security and trust models employed by Java and ActiveX.
This thesis also considers the security mechanisms implemented by the Windows
NT/2000/XP line of Microsoft Operating Systems as well as those implemented by
common web browser applications.
12

1.3. Significance of Thesis
While Java, ActiveX and the World Wide Web have now existed for several years, it
is important to reflect upon the issues that have been raised by these technologies and
to consider those issues that might be raised by the next generations of World Wide

Web oriented code delivery mechanisms.
This thesis contends that the World Wide Web and the Internet in general will be one
of the major channels for code distribution in the near future. As such it is important
to examine the security issues raised by current fonns of executable web content so
that the next generations of such code can build on this experience.

13

2. Research Methods and Models
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2.1. Overview
This chapter outlines the research methods that will be employed in this thesis.

2.2. Research Questions
This thesis aims to answer several important questions regarding the security risks

posed by current web technologies. All of these questions revolve around client

machines and consumers of World Wide Web services, as opposed to service and
content providers.
Does executable WWW content pose a significant security threat to client
machines?
This thesis attempts to detennine whether or not there are significant inherent
security risks posed by the concept of executable web content. By examining two

such fonns of executable web content, this thesis attempts to highlight the basic level
of risk that technologies such as Java and ActiveX must attempt to guard against.
Do the security mechanisms offered by these technologies provide a suitable
level of protection?

This thesis also examines the concepts behind the security mechanisms implemented
by both Java and ActiveX. It pays particular attention to the question of whether or

not the security models on offer are adequate to offset any inherent security risks (if
any) posed by the use of executable web content.
Are there significant differences in the security mechanisms provided by
popular WWW browsers?

15

The security models offered by Java and ActiveX are also examined in the context of
the web browsers through which such code will operate. This thesis examines the
differences between the security features offered by current web browser
applications and assess the role played by such browsers in reducing any risks posed
by executable web content technologies. Web browser security featlll'es will only be
discussed in tenns of their relationship to executable web content technologies
Are there significant benefits to be gained from using secure desktop operating
systems in conjunction with WWW applications?

Finally, this thesis attempts to detennine whether or not there are any real security
benefits to be gained from using a desktop operating system that implements various
security controls. It examines the code signing, access control and auditing features
of the Windows NT/2000/XP line of Microsoft operating systems in order to
detennine the effectiveness of operating system level controls in guarding against
any risks that might be posed by executable web content technologies such as Java
and ActiveX.

2.3. Research Validity
This thesis aims to address the research questions outlined in the preceding section.

In taking such a qualitative approach, it is intended that this thesis will ..•
These questions have been chosen in order to examine the security models employed
by executable web content technologies, as well as the ways in which these security
models interact with the security features offered by certain web browsers and
Operating Systems.

16

By examining the security issues associated with current fonns of executable web
content, this thesis aims to provide an insight into the types of security issues that
will need to be addressed by future generations of mobile code. While this thesis
does not seek to define the security architectures that will or should be employed by
such generations of code, it does aim to highlight the strengths, weaknesses and
limitations of the security models offered by current executable web content
technologies.

2.4. Summary
The research questions outlined in this chapter form the basis of this thesis. These
questions are addressed after examining the technologies in question.

17

3. Aims of Security and Threats Posed by
Malicious Code
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3.1. Overview
Tiris chapter provides an overview of the types of risks posed by various fonns of

executable code and the aims of computer security that are threatened by these risks.
While the security risks posed by malicious code such as viruses, worms and Trojans
have been discussed at length in many texts over a number of years, this chapter

highlights some unique security concerns raised by the use of executable web content
technologies. In particular, it highlights the different models of distribution between
traditional stand-alone applications and code delivered via the World Wide Web.

3.2. Aims of Security
Many authors including Pfleeger (2000) and Pipkin (2000) describe three major of
computer and infonnation security, these being Confidentiality, Integrity and

Availability. Two additional aims, Authenticity and Non-Repudiation are also often
discussed. Essentially, any fonn of attack can be categorised as a breach of one or

more of these aims.
This thesis will define these aims in the following manner:
Confidentiality:

This aim encompasses the idea that information or

infonnation systems should only be available to those that are authorised to
access the resources.
Integrity:

Refers to the concept that data, information or infonnation

systems should be modified only by those that are authorised to do so.
Availability: This aim suggests that infonnation, systems or other resources
should be available to authorised parties when required

19

Authenticity: This aim states that people or devices must be correctly
identified and determined to be genuine.

Non-Repudiation: The goal of non-repudiation is that entities must be
accountable for the actions and be unable to falsely deny these actions.
This thesis takes the view that confidentiality, integrity and availability are the
primary goals of any computer or infonnation security effort and that authenticity
and non-repudiation, while being important in their own right, support these first
three aims.

For example, the principle of confidentiality requires that only

authorised people are able to read, view or make use of information. Authenticity
plays a major role in the fulfilment of this aim, as it also does with integrity and
availability. For this reason, this thesis refers to the three major aims of computer
and information security and confidentiality, integrity and availability, while
recognising the importance of authenticity and non-repudiation.
1b.is thesis considers these aims as they relate to desktop systems. While these same
aims can apply to a range of information assets and systems, this thesis is primarily
concerned with desktop systems.

3.3. Threats Posed by Malicious Code
The idea of malicious code is nothing new. While some forms of malicious code did
exist before the 1980s, that particular decade was pivotal in the history of malicious
code. The late 1980s saw the emergence of several notable forms of malicious code

including the Brain and Stoned viruses (White, Kephart, Chess, 1995) as well as the
Morris Wonn.

These and other examples of malicious code demonstrated the

vulnerability of systems to executable code written with malicious intent. While
many of these examples affected the integrity and availability of systems and
20

information, the potential was there for code to breach all of the aims previous
mentioned.

The 1990s saw several new types of malicious code including macro viruses. These
viruses forced many to re-think their views of viruses. These viruses propagated by
attaching themselves to documents rather than executable files or boot sectors of
disks. This proved to be quite a successful vector for virus propagation. Given the
number of macro-supporting documents written, stored and shared, the use of
docwnents as hosts for viruses led to many widespread infections (CERT, 2000a).

Since the late 1990s there have been a number of wonns that have caused

widespread infections. Some of these such as the Loveletter wonn (CERT, 2000b)
have blurred the lines between viruses and worms. Some have begun to refer to such
pieces of malicious code as Virus/Worm Hybrids (Nachenberg, n.d).

Many of the forms of executable code in use today are quite different to those used in
the 1980s and other periods in the history of computer usage. Today ex(:cutable code
may exist in the form of executable program files, document macros as well as other
fonns such as executable web content. One of the main aims of this thesis is to

examine the possibility of malicious code being implemented using executable web
content technologies such as Java and AvtiveX

3.4. Executable Web Content Specific Threats
This thesis identifies a number of risks and threats as being specific to executable
web content. While the threats raised by forms of malicious code such as viruses,
worms and Trojans have been clearly documented over a number of years, this thesis
will expand upon some of these threats and will contend that there are several risks
that specific to forms of executable Web content such as Java and ActiveX.
21

3.4.1. Models of Code Distribution
Traditional file infecting and boot sector viruses such as Brain and Stoned achieved
widespread infections due to the fact that their method of propagation mirrored the
prevailing model of code distribution. At the time, sharing of executable code via

the swapping of disks was common.

In more recent years email has been a major vector for infection by malicious code.
Examples of email-borne viruses and worms such as Melissa and LoveLetter have
highlighted the suitability of email as a major vector for malicious code attacks.
Again these fonns of malicious code have exploited a major mechanism for the
distribution of executable code. The transferral of executable program code and
macro capable documents is now so common that many forms of malicious code

now use this as the primary method of propagation.
Executable web content employs a significantly different model of execution when
compared with other forms of software. Such code is not distributed as a shrinkwrapped retail product, nor is it passed armmd between users, nor is it transferred via
email. By definition executable web content is executable code that is attached to
web pages and transparently downloaded and executed as part of that web page. As
a result malicious executable web content will have significantly different vectors for
infection than other fonns of malicious code such as viruses and Trojan horses. As
there is little sharing of Java Applets or ActiveX Controls directly between users
(See Figures 1 & 2) the distribution models for viruses and executable web content
are not very closely aligned.

~model of distribution of executable web content is more closely aligned with the
typical distribution model of Trojan Horses.

In this model of distribution, the

22

malicious code is more likely to be distributed from a single source or group or
sources than by propagation between users as is the case with a more conventional
virus.
This thesis contends that the behaviour of malicious executable web content is more
likely to be comparable with that of Trojan Horses than viruses or wonn. While this
thesis does not dismiss the possibility that a malicious ActiveX Control or Java
Applet could be used as a delivery mechanism for a more conventional virus or
wonn, it does take the view that malicious Java or ActiveX Code will be more likely
take the form of a Trojan.

3.4.2. User Involvement
Another factor that distinguishes malicious executable web content from other fonns
of malicious code is the level of user involvement. As executable web content is run
when the page containing it is viewed, there is often very little choice on the part of
the user as to whether or not that code is to be executed. When the user makes a
decision to go to a web page, there is no real prior indication that a page contains
Java Applets or ActiveX Controls.

In many cases if a user were to be affected by a

piece of malicious executable web content, the only conscious decision might have
been the initial decision to visit the web page. Depending of configuration of web
browsers, personal firewalls, anti-malware or content filtering software, users may be
presented with a warning prior to the execution of such code, at which point a
conscious decision can be made. However in many cases the downloading and
execution of the code happims automatically and transparently.

23
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program.file
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program from
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Program User

Program User

Users may transfer

Program User

Users may transfer

Figure 1: Standalone Program Distribution Model

Web page
containing
CXCCb1ab\c code

Each user downloads
copy of Java Applet

Java Applet

""'·

Java Applet

Java Applet

1----,M ""'·
Very little

1---<M ""'·
Very little

Figure 2: Executable Web Content Distribution Model

In this sense, executable web content is similar to executable code that might arrive
via email In both cases the user does not have to consciously seek out the piece of
code.

3.5. Summary
Malicious executable code has the potential to affect the aims of confidentiality,
integrity and availability. While it is not the intention of this thesis to re-examine the
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threat posed by malicious code in general, this thesis does contend that malicious
executable web content does pose some specific threats. These threats have been
described in this chapter.

In particular this chapter has identified models of

distribution and level of user interaction as two are.11...s in which the possibility of
malicious executable web content raises some specific concerns.

25

4. The Java Programming Language
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4.1. Overview
When Sun Microsystems released the Java Language in 1995, it was surrounded by
both genuine interest and a large degree of industry hype. Java is an object oriented
programming language that is well suited to use with networked environments such
as the World Wide Web.
Although Java can be used to develop stand-alone applications, much of its
popularity stems from its networking capabilities. When used in an environment

such as the World Wide Web, the Java language is typically used to create
distributed applications referred to as applets. These applets can be downloaded and
executed on a wide range of heterogeneous platforms. Java applets and ActiveX
Controls (discussed later in this thesis) comprise two popular fonns of executable

web content.
This chapter will discuss the origins of the Java language, the characteristics that

define it, its security architecture and the ways in which the language has evolved.

4.2. Introducing the Java Language
The Java programming language was developed by Sun Microsystems. The release
of the language in I995 was greeted with both g~nuine interest and a high degree of
industry hype. In many ways, the explosion of interest in this new language has

mirrored the excitement surrounding the World Wide Web itself. In the years since

its release, Java has become one of the most popular and high profile languages
available to software developers (McGraw & Felten, 1998).
The Java language exists in several fomts. While Sun distributes the language
through various versions of its Java Development Kits (JDK 1.0, 1995; JDK I.I,
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1996; JDK 1.2, 1998), Java Runtime Environment (JRE, 1998) and other
downloadable resources, Java technology has also been licensed by a number of
vendors including Microsoft and Netscape. TWs thesis will use the term Java to

describe the language as specified by Sun Microsystems and implemented in various
versions of Sun's JDK.
There are a number of Java related technologies that exist around the periphery of the
language itself.

Some of these related technologies are produced by Sun

Microsystems while others have been developed by other parties. It is not the
intention of this thesis to examine all possible java-related technologies and APls,

rather it will discuss the basic language itself and the security issues that it raises.
One notable example of these peripheral technologies is what Sun has named Java
Beans. Java Bean technology is an Application Programming Interface (API) that

provides a software component architecture for the Java language (Hamilton, 1997).
Java Beans are small, independent Java components that can be combined to create
larger, more complex applications. Java beans have some similarities to ActiveX
Controls in that they are both software component architectures.
There are also a number of other Java APis that can be used with the Java language
to provide database connectivity, speech capabilities, telephony features and other
functions to extend the capabilities of the language (Sun Microsystems, 2000).

4.3. Java Vs JavaScript
It is important to note that Java and JavaScript are not the same things. JavaScript is

a scripting language that can be used in conjunction with web pages to perform some
actions when a page is viewed with a JavaScript capable browser. Unlike the Java
language, JavaScripts are not compiled in any way. As stated earlier, this thesis
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intends to focus on binary fonns of executable code and as such a detailed discussion
regarding security issues raised by JavaScript and other scripting languages is outside
the scope of this thesis.

Given the number of variations of the Java language, peripheral technologies such as
Java Beans, and the number of additional APis available, the terminology
surrounding the Java language can become very confused. This thesis will use the
tenn Java to describe the core language as specified by Sun Microsystems and as
implemented in the various JDK releases.

4.4. Java Applets as
Content

a Form of Executable Web

Like most programming languages, Java can be used to create stand-alone
applications.

However, much of its popularity arises from its ability to create

distributed applications referred to as applets.

These applets can be added to Web pages and as such, they comprise one fonn of
executable web content. Java applets are typically downloaded to and executed on
the client machine when the web page is viewed. When attached to web pages, Java
applets can be used for a wide range of purposes. At one end of this spectrum,
applets may be used to display simple eye-catching animations or perfonn other such

tasks. Towards the centre of the spectrum, an applet could be used to extend the
capabilities of a web page and/or browser, by adding user interface features. At the
other extreme of this spectrum, Java applets could be used to deploy complex
distributed applications.

A Java applet is added to a web page by using the APPLET tag within the H1ML file
that makes up the web page. As this thesis is not intended to act as an HTML
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reference, the syntax and semantics of the APPLET HTML tag will not be discussed
here. However, detailed explanations and examples can be found in any number of
HTML references or from organisations such as the World Wide Web Consortium
(www.w3.org).

4.5. Characteristics of the Java Language
Sun Microsystems (1996) have described the Java language as "A simple, objectoriented, network-savvy, interpreted, robust, secure, architecture neutral, portable,
high-performance, multithreaded, dynamic language."

In describing the language in such a way, it seems that Sun is acknowledging the fact
that a large degree of hype surrounds the language. Regardless of this hype, this
string of buzzwords does list some important characteristics of the language.

4.5.1. Portability
Portability is one of Java's most important characteristics (Sun, 1996; Gosling &
McGilton, 1995). This portability has helped to make Java one of today's most
popular languages. Given the portable, cross-platform nature of the language, Java is
well suited to the heterogeneous nature of the World Wide Web and has become one
of the most popular tools for developing distributed applications (McGraw & Felten,
1998).
Java's portability stems from its use of bytecodes as an intermediate level of
compilation. Rather than being a completely compiled or completely interpreted
language, Java takes a hybrid approach. Java solll'Ce code is compiled to a series of
byte codes, which are in tum interpreted by a Java Virtual Machine (NM) (Pistoia,
Relle, Gupta, Nagnu, Raman, 1999). The bytecodes comprise the instructions that
drive the NM. Theoretically, a NM can be implemented as a piece of software
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nmning on almost any computer platform.

Alternatively, a JVM could be

implemented in hardware. In such a case, the Java bytecodes would form the native
instructions for the Java machine. The difference would be largely transparent to

Java program (Edwards, 1997).
While this "Write Once, Run Anywhere" (Sun, 1999) approach makes Java a viable
alternative for many development projects, many consider that the performance
degradation resulting from the interpretation process makes the language unsuitable
for large complex applications. In many cases, Just-In-Time (JIT) compilers are
considered necessary in order to improve the performance of Java code. Rather than
interpreting Java bytecodes, IlT compilers compile the bytecodes into code native to
the particular platform.

This native code is generally faster to execute than

interpreted bytecodes (Appel, 1999). In spite of the perfonnance improvements
offered by JIT compilers, there are still significant execution overheads compared to
the execution of purely native code.

4.5.2. Security
Security is another important characteristic of the Java language.

The security

features of the language (which will be discussed later in this chapter) demonst:J.ate
some commitment on the part of Sun Microsystems to produce a secure language.
Sun (1999) acknowledges that in a language as well suited to distributed computing,
security is an important requirement. For this reason, security has been an important
consideration since the earliest stages of the design of the language. In fact, it is
often unusual for security to rank so highly as a consideration at such early stages of

the development of the language (Pistoia et al. 1999).
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The Java language boasts an integral security model (Pistoia et al., 1999; Gosling &
McGilton, 1995), the evolution of which will be discussed in this chapter. This

model has undergone several modifications since the release of the language in 1995.
These modifications have been widely discussed by a nwnber of commentators

(Gong et al., 1997; Koved et al., 1998; Chess & Morar, 1998; McGraw & Felten,
1998). Each major revision of the Java language has seen significant changes to the
security mechanisms offered by the language. The evolution of the Java security
model shows an interesting progression away from an all-or-nothing approach

towards a flexible, policy driven approach.
The cornerstone of Java security is a restrictive run-time environment commonly
referred to as the Sandbox (Gong, 1998; Pistoia at al, 1999, p70). Since the release
of the Java in 1995, the operation of this sandbox has evolved significantly with each
revision of the language.

Despite this evolution, its role has remained largely

unchanged- to restrict the actions of untrusted, possibly malicious code.

4.6. The Evolution of the Java Security Model
The initial versions of the Java Language (JDK 1.0, 1995) provided a largely all-or·
nothing approach to the issue of trust. The Java sandbox provided a tight restrictive
environment in which untrusted applets could be safely executed. The decision as to
whether or not an applet was considered to be trusted was made simply on the
grounds of its source. Under this model, code loaded from the local file system
would be considered to be trusted and would be allowed to operate without
restriction. Alternatively, code loaded from external sources such as the World Wide
Web would be subject to tight sandbox restrictions (Gong, 1998).
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Comments were often made (Pistoia et al, 1999, p71), however that the tight sandbox
restrictions of this initial model prevented reputable developers from fully exploiting
the advantages offered by the Java language. In many cases, it was difficult to write
practical software given the tight restrictions of the sandbox. Typically, untrusted
code (any code not loaded from the local file-system) would not be allowed access to
resources such as files. Additionally, applets would only be allowed to use network
resources in order to contact the site from which the applet was downloaded. Chess
& Morar (1998) also describes several other sandbox restrictions and in doing so,

makes the point that it was inevitable that mechanisms would have to be provided to
let trusted applets step outside of the restrictive sandbox.
Simply making more privileges available within the sandbox was not an adequate
long-tenn solution (Presotto cited in Sun, 1996). There was a distinct danger that
sandbox implementations would grow to include more and more privileges until the
sandbox allowed almost full system access and restricted very little. Eventually this
trend would defeat the purpose for which the sandbox was originally intended.
Sun's second major version of the Java Language (JDK 1.1, 1996) made some
attempt to remedy this situation by allowing trusted applets to execute without the
tight restrictions imposed by the sandbox (Pistoia et al., 1999, p72; Gong, 1998).
While the sandbox remained an integral component of the JDK I.I security model,
applets could now be signed using digital signature technologies. Applets with
signatures trusted by the client were treated in much the same way as code !11aded
from the local file system, in that it would not be subjected to tight sandbox
restrictions (Pistoia et al., 1999, p72). However, this was still largely an all or
nothing approach. Decisions regarding trust were made on an applet-by-applet basis
and an applet could only be considered either completely trusted or completely
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untrusted. Under this model, there was no notion that code could be partially trusted
(McGraw & Felten, 1998).
The next version of the language saw several major changes. Not the least of which
was a renaming of the language. With the release of JDK 1.2, Sun renamed the
language Java 2. While the name Java 2 describes the current state of the language
itself, the tenn JDK 1.2 is used to describe the Sun's implementation of this
language. This thesis will adhere to this convention and use the tenn Java 2 to
describe the language in general. The term JDK 1.2 will be used to describe a
specific version of Sun's Java 2 implementation In addition to this change in name;
JDK 1.2 introduced a heavily re-designed security architecture.
This latest security architecture focuses around the concept of a security policy,
which can grant varying permissions to different applets in a fine-grained manner. In
contrast to previous versions, this model does not force a yes or no decision to be
made as to whether or not an applet is executed within the sandbox. Instead, applets
can be assigned various privileges depending on the level of trust placed in the code.
This highly flexible approach has the effect tha4 "the entire meaning of sandbox
becomes a bit vague" (McGraw & Felten, 1998). Instead of one clearly defined
sandbox, each applet can in effect, run in its own sandbox each of which can be
afforded different permissions.
While this approach does offer a high degree of flexibility, it relies heavily on the
creation of a sound policy. This raises the important of issue of who is responsible
for the creation and maintenance of such a policy. End users may not have the
experience or expertise necessary and system administrators may see such a security
policy as a low priority in relation to other more pressing tasks (McGraw & Felten,
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1998). In addition, once a policy is defined, it must be maintained. The environment

in which such a policy operates is often very dynamic. There is a risk that once a
policy is defined, it will be forgotten. In such a case, the old adage "out of sight, out
of mind" may be particularly relevant.
This highlights the fact that the technical security features offered by the language
are highly dependent on sound configuration. As such, management becomes a very
important issue.

4.7. Key Components of the Java Security Model
There are several components of the Java language which enforce the Java Security
model. In particular, Java makes use of what it refers to as the Bytecode verifier,
Class Loader and Security Manager. Together these components work to enforce the
Java Security Model.
Not surprisingly, the Java Class Loader is used to invoke Java classes as they are
needed. A typical NM contains a "Primordial" loader as well as any nwnber of
custom Class Loaders (Venners, 2002).

These class loaders can if written

appropriately, enforce separation of applets by providing distinct namespaces for
different applets and applications (Venners, 2002; Oaks, 1998a). Class Loaders also
aim to guard against malicious code masquerading as trusted Java APis (Venners,
'

2002; McManis, 1996). Together with the Bytecode Verifier and Security Manager,
the Class Loader comprise the ·major components of the Java Sandbox.

The Security Manager component enforces Sandbox restrictions by determining what
actions can be taken by loaded classes. Oaks (1998b) makes the point that many of
the restrictions enforced by the Security Manager are similar to the types of controls
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that one would normally consider to be the responsibility of an operating system,
such as arbitrating access to files, network resources and other resources.
As the name suggests, the Bytecode Verifier is tasked with examining Java Classes
to ensure that they conform to the specifications of the Java language. Titls aims to

ensure that classes are not malformed either deliberately or accidentally. The
Bytecode Verifier checks the integrity of the bytecodes to ensure that classes have
not been created using hostile compilers, do not contain buffer overflows as well as
performing many other tests. The eventual aim is that the once the class has been
verified, it can be executed with confideuce by the NM (Gosling & McGilton,
1996).

4.8. Implementations of Java Technology
While this chapter has mainly discussed Sun's design of the Java language and its
implementation via Sun's JDK releases, Java technology has been licensed by a
number of vendors including Microsoft and Netscape. As a result, there are several
major implementations of Java technology.
Many of today's major web browsers, including Internet Explorer and Netscape
Navigator, Mozilla and Opera all support the use of the Java language. Java enabled
web browsers often ship with their own implementation of the NM. While each
vendor supplied JVM should confonn to the Java specifications from Sun,
implementations can vary greatly.

In addition, vendor supplied JVMs may

incorporate proprietary extensions. As a result, it can be confusing as to which NM
is used to execute a particular piece of Java code. Additionally, it is reasonable to
expect that different implementations may contain different bugs. These bugs could
possibly be exploited in order to bypass various security mechanisms. In addition to
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the NMs incorporated within web browsers, Sun distributes its own NM as part of
it JDKs and JREs. Sun also distributes Java 2 NM plug-ins for the major web
browsers. When these plug-ins are installed, older Java code can still be executed by
the browser's inbuilt JVM. When Java 2 code is encountered, it can be diverted and
executed using Sun's Java 2 plug-ins.
This situation can become very confused when multiple NMs are installed on one
machine. Chess & Morar (1998) describes a hypothetical case in which;

" •.. you have a JVM developed by Microsoft inside Internet Explorer, a
NM developed by Netscape inside Navigator, a NM developed by Sun

inside Lotus Notes, and the Java plugins from Sun inside both browsers for
a grand total of four different NMs in five different locations using four
different signature databases and four sets of security settings."
The replication of signature databases and security settings makes it very difficult to
implement and maintain a coherent, overall security policy. Additionally there is the
possibility that each different NM will have its share of design and implementation
errors, which may be exploited by an attacker. Currently there are no known tools to
centralise the management of Java security across a number of separate JVMs (Chess
& Morar, 1998).

4.9_ Risks and Threats Associated with the Java
Language
While Java is an interesting and no doubt useful technology, there are a number of
threats associated with its use. As detailed in previous chapters, there are certain
risks specific to executable code. As Java provides a means whereby executable
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code can be run on a client machine as a result of viewing a web page, its use does

imply a certain level of risk.

4.1 O. Hostile Java Applets
Several hostile Java Applets have been written and for some the source code is
available. Many of these act as Trojans with effects range from annoyances such as
displaying images of Dancing Bears to the unauthorised use of resources such as
power time to false login prompts designed to capture passwords (LaDue, n.d).

4.11. Challenges Facing the Java Language
While Java undoubtooly has a great deal of potential, there are a number of
challenges facing the language. Concerns over the perfonnance of the language,
reluctance to rewrite legacy applications, problems with the "write once, run

anywhere" concept and fighting between Sun and Microsoft all threaten the long
term viability of the Java language.

The performance of the Java language has been seen by many as a major concern.
Given Java's commitment to portability and its reliance on bytecodes as an
intermediate level of compilation, it is inevitable that the performance of the
language will suffer to some degree. One concern is that the Java language may not
be able to offer the performance levels required for mission-critical applications.
Sun claimed that the release of Java 2 would put an end to the performance problems
that had previously plagned the langnage.

Another major concern is that the Java language is becoming fragmented as more
and more platform specific APis and class libraries become available. While such
additions to the Java language can be helpful in optimising Java applications for
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particular platfonns, they do tend to limit the "Write once, run anywhere" potential
of the language. To combat this trend, Sun has implemented the "100% Pure Java"

Program (Sun Microsystems, 1999). The aim of this program is to certify that a Java
program does not rely on any platfonn specific code and that it has been tested for
cross platform compatibility and portability.

Fighting between Sun and Microsoft also threatens the future of the Java language.
Initially Microsoft licensed Java technology from Sun Microsystems.

Sun

considered that with Microsoft supporting Java, the language would quickly become
a de facto standard. Microsoft was interested in licensing the language in order to
compete with Netscape's Navigator browser, which also made use of Java (Wong,

1998).
Since its licensing of the Java language, Microsoft has been accused of trying to
"kidnap" the Java language by distributing a NM that Sun claimed violated
Microsoft's license agreement

Sun claimed that Microsoft had deliberated

attempted to undermine the cross-platfonn nature of the Java language; by adding
platfonn specific APis and omitting certain core Java APis. As a result, Sun began
legal action against Microsoft in October 1997 (Sun Microsystems, n.d; Microsoft

Cozporation, 1997).
While the Java language shows a lot of potential, its future is by no means

guaranteed. While there is little doubt that the Java language has been thrust into
public attention by some effective marketing, there is also a great deal of genuine

interest surrounding the language. If nothing else, the language has highlighted the
level of industry interest in a programming language suited to use with an
environment such as the World Wide Web. The Java language has several important
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challenges ahead. How Sun handles these challenges will go a long way to deciding
the future of the language.

4.12. Summary
Toe Java language was developed with several key objectives, including portability,
robustness and security. Since the release of the language in 1995, Java has evolved
significantly. The current version of the language is marketed under the name Java 2
and implemented by Sun in the fonn of the JDK 1.2.
Although its implementation and design may havr changed, the Java's Sandbox
remains a central component of the language. The purpose of this Sandbox is to
restrict the actions of possibly malicious Java code, by executing this code within a
protective run-time environment.
Toe most current version of the Java language allows various permissions to be
granted to an applet depending on the level of trust placed in the code. These
pennissions can be granted in an app\et-by-app!et basis in accordance with a security
policy. This provides a high level of flexibility but raises several issues regarding
configuration and management.
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5. Microsoft's ActiveX Architecture
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5.1. Overview
The term ActiveX describes a number of technologies from Microsoft, all of which
are based on the company's Component Object Model (COM) and Object Linking

and Embedding (OLE) technologies. This thesis concentrates on one specific type of
ActiveX Object - ActiveX Controls, as these can be added to web pages and

comprise one popular form of executable web content.
ActiveX technology is tightly integrated with both the Windows family of operating
systems and Microsoft Internet Explorer and as such, many of the security issues

raised by the use of ActiveX will be discussed in later chapters. However, in order to
fully understand these security implications, it is necessary to examine the
architecture that underlies this technology. Some of the discussion in chapter does
not relate directly to security issues, although a thorough understanding of the

technology will enable a more detailed discussion of these issues in later chapters.
This chapter discusses the architecture behind ActiveX and the security mechanisms
put in place by the technology itself. Security mechanisms put in place by operating
systems and applications that make use of ActiveX controls will not be discussed in
this chapter.

5.2. ActiveX, COM and OLE
ActiveX is a tenn used to describe a range of technologies based on Microsoft's
Component Object Model (COM) and Object Linking and Embedding (OLE)

technologies.
Microsoft's Component Object Model (COM) is a specification designed to allow
reusable binary objects to interoperate and communicate (Li & Economopoulos,
1997, p.11). As it is a binary specification, COM objects can be written in any
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programming language that can produce a binary result that conforms to these
specifications.
Microsoft's Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) technology builds on the
framework provided by COM.

OLE's main role is to "enable and facilitate

component integration" (MSDN [CD-Rom], 1997). OLE technology first appeared
in 1991 and was originally designed as method for creating rich, compound
documents that could incorporate a number of enhancements such as sound and
video.

The next version of OLE went way beyond this concept of compound

documents and provided a much more comprehensive architecture for component
integration (MSDN [CD-Rom], 1997).
Microsoft draws comparisons between the software component approach of
COM/OLE and the hardware component approach oflntegrated Circuits (!Cs). Just
as electronic devices can be created by connecting pre-made and pre-tested
integrated circuits, component architectures such as OLE/COM allow software
developers to create complex software by connecting existing components (MSDN
[CD-Rom], 1997).

Given that these components have been well tested and

documented, software developers do not need to re-implement fundamental
algorithms or even consider the implementation of the particular component

In 1996, Microsoft coined the phrase ActiveX. This concept was intended to form
the cornerstone of the corporation's "Activate the Internet" strategy. Microsoft drew
together a range of concepts based on OLE and COM technologies and renamed
them under the banner of ActiveX. While, the tenn ActiveX covers a range of
objects including Automation Server and Controllers, COM objects, Documents and
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Containers (Anderson, 1997, p. 9), this thesis concentrates on ActiveX Controls, as
they comprise one form of executable web content.

5.3. OLE Controls and Visual Basic
Many Visual Basic developers would be familiar with the concept of component
based software development, in particular with VBX and OLE Controls. Component
based software development with Visual Basic began with the introduction of VBXs
in Visual Basic 3.

VBXs allowed software developers to create applications

containing pre-built components and were essentially Windows Dynamic Link
Library (DLL) files that conformed to certain architectural specifications. These
components were usually self contained and controlled their own user interfaces.
While the original VBXs were a boon for software developers, they did have severe
limitations. The specifications to which VBXs had to conform were limited to 16-bit
Windows/Intel platforms. In order to be of use with operating systems such as
Windows NT and Windows 95, a new 32-bit control architecture would need to be
designed (Li & Economopoulos, 1997, p. 174).
This new 32-bit architecture took the form of OLE controls. These controls were
considerably more powerful, flexible and robust than their VBX predecessors. In
addition, OLE controls could be used by a range of containers other than visual basic
(Li & Economopoulos, 1997, p. 174). OLE Controls are often referred to as OCXs

as these controls were generally given this file extension.

5.4. Adapting OLE Controls to the World Wide Web
With a surge in the popularity of the World Wide Web, Microsoft attempted to
prepare many of its existing technologies for use with this new medium. In the face
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of competition from technologies such as Sun's Java programming language,
Microsoft made the decision to re-vamp its OLE control technologies in order to

make them better suited to low-bandwidth Web usage (Li & Economopoulos, 1997,
p 187).
Microsoft recognised that OLE Control-like components could be used to extend the
capabilities of web pages in much the same way as wifu Visual Basic programs.
However, with the low bandwidth environment of the World Wide Web the need for
lean, efficient controls was even more pronounced than was ever the case with
Visual Basic applications. This need gave rise to ActiveX Controls.
ActiveX Controls are effectively streamlined OLE Controls.

While the

specifications for OLE Controls require the control to implement a large amount of
mandatory functionality, the requirements for ActiveX Controls are greatly relaxed.
In order to qualify as an ActiveX Control, an object needs only to implement one

mandatory interface (discussed later in this chapter). In addition, it must also be able
to self-register and unregister (also described later in this chapter). This effectively
means that any COM Object can qualify as an ActiveX Control, without having to
fulfil higher-level OLE requirements. As a result, ActiveX Controls are free to
implement only the interfaces are absolutely necessary. By freeing developers of the
need to implement unnecessary features, ActiveX controls are better suited to use
with the World Wide Web than previous OLE Controls (Microsoft Corporation,

1999).
ActiveX controls comprise one form of executable web content. Like Java applets,
ActiveX controls can be added to web pages in such a way that they download,
install and execute when the page is viewed with a compatible browser,
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Microsoft's Internet Explorer browser has in built support for ActiveX controls.
Plug-ins are available for Netscape that allow ActiveX controls to be used with
Netscape Navigator.
As a specific type of ActiveX Object, controls are always in-process. That is they
execute within the same process as their container application (Anderson, 1997,
p 10). When used as a form of executable web content, a Web Browser such as
Microsoft Internet Explorer acts as the control's container. Hence, when a control is
added to a web page it executes within the same process as the Web Browser.

5.5. Classifying ActiveX Controls
While they comprise one form of ActiveX object, ActiveX controls can be further
divided into several categories. The main division revolves around whether a control
is classed as visual or non-visual. Several control variations can be seen in Figure 3.

ActiveX Control
(Any COM object)

ActiveX Control
without visual

ActivcX Control
Compliant to OC96
OCX Support

Non-Visual ActiveX
Control
Fully oompliant and
designed to OC96 and
Internet Extenslon

Figure 3: ActiveX Control Types (Li & Economopoulos, 1997, pl91)

ActiveX Controls can then be broken down into two categories - those with a visual
representation and those without. Controls with visual representations are often used

46

I

~
!

to extend the capabilities of a user interface. These controls not only manage their

own data, they also maintain their own user interface (Li & Economopoulos, 1997,
pl92).
Alternatively, ActiveX Controls can exist without any fonn of user interface. These
controls can be used to implement business logic or perfonn calculations behind the
scenes. When embedded within a web page, ActiveX controls do not necessarily
need to be a highly visible element of a web page.

5.6. ActiveX Control Capabilities
ActiveX Controls can make use of a variety of different Application Programming
Interfaces (APls),just as if the control were any other Windows executable program.
As a result, ActiveX Controls can access a number of resources using standard
Win32 functions including local file systems, network connections and the Windows
registry.
Unlike with Java Applets, there is nothing built into the ActiveX Control architecture
to restrain the actions of an ACtiveX Control once it has begun execution. ActiveX
Controls are subject to operating system security mechanisms and may be restrained

using third party tools. However there is nothing in the ActiveX architecture itself
that limits the capabilities of a control. As such, controls have effectively the same
capabilities as standalone windows programs.

5.7. Implementing ActiveX Cr,ntrols
ActiveX Controls are binary objects that confonn to certain specifications.
Historically, compiled OLE controls were given the extension .OCX, although they

are effectively implemented within a Windows Dynamic Link Library (DLL). In
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fact, Microsoft now recommends that the extension DLL be used in favour of OCX
(Microsoft Corporation, 1999).

Not all Windows DLLs implement ActiveX

Controls. Many simply implement libraries of compiled code. However, those that
do contain ActiveX Controls may implement one or more controls within a single
DLL file. More detailed discussion of the tools commonly used to develop ActiveX
Controls can be fowtd in Appendix B.

5. 7.1. Interfaces and Methods
ActiveX Controls expose their functionality to the containers that host them through

the methods that they implement. Related methods are usually grouped together to
form interfaces. Each Interface of each COM object residing on a computer system
has a unique Interface ID (IID).
Each ActiveX Control must implement at least one basic interface, commonly known
as the IUnk.own Interface. This interface contains three methods that are vitally
important to the way in which COM Objects and ActiveX Controls operate.
The first of these three methods is called QuerylnterfaceO. Programs making use of
a COM object can use this method to obtain pointers to other interfaces implemented
by the object. Client programs should only be able to access the functionality of an
interface by first calling the QuerylnterfaceO method (Li & Economopoulos, 1997,
p. 28).

The other two methods of the !Unknown Interface deal with the fact that a COM
object or ActiveX Control may be used concurrently by more than one client
program. Each interface of a control contains a reference counter that determines
when it is safe for a control to be discarded from memory. The AddRefQ and
ReleaseQ methods are used to increment and decrement these counters respectively.
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When a client obtains a reference to an interface (by calling QuerylnterfaceO) it must
call the AddRef() rnethod(Li & Economopoulos, 1997, p. 31). When the program no
longer requires the services of the interface, it can call the ReleaseQ method to
decrement the reference counter.

When each interface is no longer needed, the

control can unload itself from memory and free any resources that it currently holds
(Li & Economopoulos, 1997, p. 32).
Many COM objects also support the concept of "late binding". Early binding is
suitable if a client knows exactly what controls will be needed throughout the entire
lifespan of the client application. In many cases, this is not practical, particularly in
the case of development environments such as Visual Basic. The Visual Basic
environment cannot reasonably be expected to know the details of every COM object
it will ever host. Late binding solves this problem by allowing clients to discover the
capabilities of a COM object at run-time rather than compile-time. Late binding is
achieved through the use of a specific interface called IDispatch. This interface
allows a client to detennine the capabilities of an object at run-time (Li &
Economopoulos, 1997, p. 54). So-called "Dual Interface" objects support both early
and late binding (by providing an !Dispatch interface), although there are significant
perfonnance overheads when late binding is used.

5.7.2. GUIDs and UUIDs
COM technology (and therefore ActiveX technology) relies heavily on the use of
large, randomly generated numerical sequences. The generation process talces into
account factors including the current date and time in order to produce a unique 128bit identifier. The result is a randomly generated number large enough that the
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possibility of generating the same twice is negligible (Li & Economopoulos, 1997, p.
33).
These numbers are used to uniquely identify a range of entities including COM
objects and the interfaces that they expose. The terminology used often differs
depending on what it is that these sequences are identifying. When referring to
COM/ActiveX technology several terms and abbreviations are commonly used. The

main terms are summarised in Table 1.

Abbreviation Term
Globally Unique Identifier

GUID

UUID
CLSJD
IJD
CATID

Describes
Used to descn"be a 128-bit identifier in
general terms (not in any particular
context).
Universally Unique Identifier Used to describe a 128-bit identifier in
general terms (not in any particular
context).
Class ID
Used to identify COM objects
(lncludinl! ActiveX Controls.
Interface JD
Uniquely identifies every interface
imolemented bv evet"V control.
Identifies a component category. Used
Category ID
to state that a control implements
certain functionalitv.

Table 1: Identifier Types

The use of such numerical identifiers eliminates the ambiguity that would be caused

if such entities were simply assigned names.

For example, by using unique

identifiers, a program can be sure that it is using a particular COM Object rather than
another entity that happens to have the same name.
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5.8. ActiveX and the Windows Registry
ActiveX Controls rely heavily on the Windows Registry in order to operate (Li &
Economopoulos, 1997, p. 46; Anderson, 1997, p. 35). The Windows Registry is a
hierarchical repository containing a wide range of configuration data relating to the
operating system itself as well as installed hardware and software and information
regarding users. This registry is organised as an hierarchical collections of keys, subkeys, values and data. The structure of this registry differs slightly depending on the
version of Windows being used. However, at the top of the hierarchy are four main
keys; HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT, HKEY_CURRENT_USER, HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE and
HKEY_USERS.

Each COM object (and therefore ActiveX Control) installed on a particular computer
system has at least one entry in that system's registry. It is a requirement of an

ActiveX Control that it be able to add and remove its own registry information
(Anderson, 1997, p22; Li & Economopoulos, 1997, pp28-34). This is accomplished
using two functions implemented within the control's .DLL file titled

DLLRegisterServer and DLLUmegisterServer.
ActiveX Controls register themselves under the HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT key.

This major key contains a sub-key labelled CLSID. The same registry information
can be found under the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/Software/Classes/CLSID.

These two keys are functionally equivalent and can be used interchangeably. Each
object registers its Class ID under this CLSID registry key. Each object can then add

a nwnber of sub•keys describing various properties belonging to the object. Several
COM

objects

can

be

seen

registered

under

the

HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT/Software/Classes/CLSID key in Figure 4. This figure

shows the 128·bit CLS1Ds of several COM objects registered under the CLSID
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registry key. The figure also shows two sub-keys belonging to one COM Object and
the values and data associated with the first of these sub-keys.

r,.

Registry Editor

-,

:-1'ffil •

T

REG_SZ D:\Pro'1'am Files\Common Fies\t,lcrosoft Shared\DAO\dao360.cl
REG...SZ Apartment

Figure 4: ActiveX Control Registry Information

The registry is vitally important to the operation of COM/ActiveX on Windows
platforms.

5.9. ActiveX Controls and Microsoft Authenticode
ActiveX Control security is heavily reliant on Microsoft' s Authenticode code signing
technology.

This section will discuss the underlying technology that powers

Microsoft's Authenticode. However, it is often programs such as Internet Explorer
that use this technology to provide security in relation to ActiveX Controls.
Consequently, issues relating to the configuration, user interface and application of
Authenticode technology will be discussed in conjunction with Microsoft's Internet
Explorer Web Browser in later chapters. In contrast, this section will discuss the
underlying concepts behind Authenticode and its relationship with ActiveX Controls.
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ActiveX Control security revolves around users making an informed decision as to
whether or not a control should be allowed to begin execution. Once a control has
begun execution, the only restrictions placed on it are those provided by the

operating system or other third party security tools.
This approach differs significantly with that taken by the Java language. While Java
seeks to provide security through restricting the actions of applets at run time,
ActiveX relies on preventing hostile code from being executed.
Authenticode aims to assure the authenticity of a binary object such as an ActiveX
Control by positively identifying the author of the object. It also attempts to assure
integrity by proving that control has not been modified since its release.
Authenticode 1.0 was released in 1996, and can be used to sign various forms of
executable code including .EXE, .DLL, .OCX and Java Class files.

While

Authenticode can be used to sign a variety of types of code, it forms the only real
line of defence against malicious ActiveX controls and therefore this technology is
extremely important in relation to ActiveX.

5.9.1. Cryptographic Characteristics of Authenticode
Authenticode makes use of several existing technologies including X.509
certificates, PKCS #7 cryptographic standards and I 024-bit RSA keys for encryption
and decryption (Feghbi, Feghbi & Williams, 1999, p. 102).

In order to sign code with Authenticode, developers must first generate a key pair
and apply for a suitable certificate from a Certificate Authority (CA). In order to
obtain a certificate, applicants must submit various personal details. The certificate,
in effect binds this personal information to the developer's public key. Applicants
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must also agree to a pledge stating that they will not deliberately distribute code that
is hannful or malicious in nature.

5.10. Security Concerns Surrounding ActiveX
The use of ActiveX Controls technology does give rise to certain security concerns.
As this chapter has highlighted, ActiveX Controls are very powerful in that they
execute directly on hardware and can make use of various libraries and APls.

Additionally they are not bound by any form of sandbox-like runtime restrictions.
This thesis contends that there are very real security concerns surrounding the use
ActiveX controls as a form of executable web content. This section descnbes the
security concerns identified by this thesis.

5.10.1. ActiveX Controls Can Be Very Powerful
ActiveX Controls can be very powerful in that they can make use of any number of
libraries and AP!s.

5.10.2. ActiveX Controls Do Not Execute within a Restrictive
Environment
In contrast to Java Applets, ActiveX Controls are not designed to be executed within
a restrictive run-time environment (CERT, 2000c).

Once a Control has been

allowed to begin execution, it is not restrained by any security measures other than
those implemented by Operating Systems or third party products.

5.10.3. Reliance on Authentication
ActiveX Controls rely heavily on users being able to make decisions as to whether or
not the control should be allowed to begin execution.

Once a control has been

allowed to begin execution, it can only be restrained through OS or third party
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controls. As a result, it is imperative that users can make a decision concerning the
trustworthiness of the piece of code. This chapter has discussed the role played by
Microsoft's Authenticode code signing technology in relation to ActiveX Controls.
This reliance on authentication does give rise to certain concerns. Firstly, there is a
risk that users may not fully understand the consequences of allowing untrusted code
to execute. The is often a tendency for users, when presented with a dialog box
requesting permission for a Control to execute, to allow the action simply to dismiss
the dialog box and continue. Often the consequences of allowing untrusted code to
execute are no:t fully considered.
Additionally, reliance on authentication is a largely re-active stance. One aim of
Microsoft's Authenticode technology is to allow legal action to be taken against
individuals or organisations that sign malicious code. However, given the difficulties
and expense involved with taking legal action against such individuals or
organisations, often complicated by geographic, political and jurisdictional
boundaries, such a re-active approach may not always be practical.
In an example highlighting the dangers of ActiveX's reliance on trust, The US Dept.

of Energy sponsored Computer Incident Advisory Capability (CIAC) reports that in
2001, the certifying authority Verisign mistakenly issued two code signing
certificates to an individual believing that the person in question was an employee of
the Microsoft Corporation (CIAC, 2001). The certificates were issues the 29ili and

30m January, 2001. The CIAC advisory issuing the warning was dated 22'' March,
2001.
Such certificates could have allowed the attacker to sign code including ActiveX
Controls using the name "Microsoft Corporation".

The code would not be
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automatically trusted, but by displaying the common name ''Microsoft Corporation"
the attacker could effectively be able to conduct a social engineering attack by
convincing a user to allow the code to begin execution. As stated in the advisory
published by CIAC (2001), "The danger... is that even a security-conscious user
might agree to let the content execute, and might agree to always trust the bogus
certificate".

When the mistake was discovered, Verisign revoked the certificates by adding them
to the organisation Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs).

However the window

between the issue of the certificates and their subsequent revocation could have
given the attacker a substantial opportunity to use the certificates in a malicious
manner. Additionally, as Versigin certificates did not specify a location for the CA's
revocation list, web browsers were not able to verify the validity of the certificates
once they had been revoked (CJAC, 2001).
Trust can be a complicated concept. While it is natural for users to associate the
level of trust that they might have in a web page with the level of trust that they place
in executable web content embedded in that page, such assumptions could be
dangerous. For example, the author of a web page might not necessarily be the
author of the controls used on that web page. It is not uncommon for web page
authors to make use of third party controls. While the author of the web page might

trust that the controls are free of malicious code, this might not be the case.
Similarly, users of that web page may not draw a distinction between the page itself
(which they may trust) and the executable code used on that page (which may come
from a third party). Such users might not notice or be concerned about the fact that
the common name in a certificate might not be the same as the common name of the
site on which that code is hosted.
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5.10.4. Controls Run with User's Permissions
All ActiveX Controls execute in-process; that is they execute within the same

process as their parent container. When Controls are used in conjllllction with web
pages, this container is often a web browser such as Internet Explorer. As this

container application executes within the security context of the current user, so too
does the ActiveX Control (CERT, 2000c). As a resul4 if the current user has a high
level of privileges so too will any ActiveX Control invoked by that user. If a user
has access to various files, network resources so too will the ActiveX Control.
Additionally, if a malicious control is allowed to perform some kind of attack, any
audit logs may identify the user that invoked the control as the source of the attack.
As such, an WISuspecting user may be highlighted as the sow"Ce of an attack.

5.10.5. Malicious Controls
There are definite concerns that ActiveX Controls could be used for malicious
purposes. The most pressing concern in this area is that ActiveX Controls could be a
very convenient mechanism for the delivery of a Trojan horse to a system or as a
convenient delivery mechanism for a more conventional virus. As mentioned earlier,
the distribution model used by ActiveX Controls

5.10.6. Exploitation of Legitimate Controls
In some cases it might not be necessary for an attacker to implement a malicio~
ActiveX Control.

Attackers may be able to exploit vulnerabilities in existing

controls using data driven attacks. Controls can be marked by their authors as being
'Safe for Scripting'.

In effect, authors are claiming that their legitimate, non-

malicious controls cannot be exploited by attackers using data driven attacks.
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However this provides little assurance for control users.

Organisations such as

CERT have released a number of advisories that warn of controls that are incorrectly

labelled as 'Safe for Scripting' (CERT, 1999b; CERT, 2000c; CERT, 2001).

5.10.7. Lack of Auditing and Management Tools
Windows does not have a log dedicated to downloaded code such as Java Applets

and ActiveX Controls CERT (2000). Windows NT/2000/XP could be configured to
audit

modifications

to

certain

registry

keys

(such

as

HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT_CLSID), however the volume of entries in this key could
result in the generation of a large volumes log entries.

5.11. Summary
ActiveX is a term introduced by Microsoft to describe a variety of binary objects, all

based in some way on COM/OLE technology. Of all the different types of ActiveX
Components, this thesis is only concerned with ActiveX Controls, as they comprise
one fonn of executable web content.
ActiveX Controls resulted from Microsoft's attempt to adapt OLE Controls to use
with the World Wide Web. In a low-bandwidth environment such as the World
Wide Web, it is necessary that controls are as lean and efficient as possible in order
to reduce download times.

For this reason, ActiveX Controls do not need to

implement as much mandatory code as full OLE Controls.

ActiveX Control

developers need to implement very little mandatory code and are therefore free to
implement as much or as little code as is necessary to solve the problem at hand.
ActiveX Controls can be classified as either visual or non-visual. Visual controls are
often used to extend the user interface of their client

Non-visual controls are well

58

suited to implementing business rules and logic. ActiveX Controls can make use of a
variety of APis and have essentially the same capabilities as standalone executable
programs.
Unlike Java Applets, ActiveX Controls are not restrained by any restrictive run-time
environment. ActiveX Control security depends upon users making an informed
decision as to whether or not a control should be allowed to begin execution.
Microsoft's Authenticode code signing technology aims to prove the authenticity and
integrity of ActiveX Controls as well as .DLLs, .EXEs, .OCXs and .CAB files and
Java Applets.
ActiveX Controls and COM Components in are tightly integrated with both the
Windows family of operating systems and Microsoft's Internet Explorer Web
Browser. As a result, many of the security issues relating to ActiveX Controls will
be discussed in relation to both Windows and Internet Explorer in later chapters.

59

6. The Role of Web Browser and Operating
System Level Controls
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6.1. Overview
This chapter examines the role of web browsers, operating systems and third party
tools in controlling the actions of executable web content. While this thesis has

argued the importance of security mechanisms that are integrated into executable
web content technologies, this chapter highlights the importance of a layered of

defence against the possibility of malicious web content.

6.2. Web Browser Issues
As executable web content technologies are closely integrated with web browsers it
is important to consider the role of these applications in the execution and control of
such code. While many issues make it difficult to get meaningful statistics on web

browser usage, much of the web browser market is currently dominated by
Microsoft's Internet Explorer product (BrowserNews, 2002; NUA Internet Surveys,

2002). However, there are a nw~ber of other browsers that also deserve some
attention. Browsers such as Netscape, Mozilla and Opera still have a loyal following
and it is important not to overlook these products.

6.2.1. Microsoft Internet Explorer
Microsoft's Internet Explorer product currently dominates the web browser market
(BrowserNews, 2002). While it is acknowledged that Internet Explorer does suffer
from a number of vulnerabilities and that such vulnerabilities continue to be found,
this thesis limits its examination of this browser to the security mechanisms that it
implements, particularly as they relate to issues involving executable web content.

6.2.2. Zones
Internet Explorer employs a concept of zones in order to classify web sites and pages
and handle various forms of content accordingly. Internet, Local Intranet, Trusted
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and Restricted comprise the four zones provided by the browser and a set security
controls can be applied to individually to each zone.

Among these settings are

options dealing with executable web content such as Java and ActiveX.

ActiveX related settings include options regarding the download and execution of
signed and unsigned controls. One of the major concerns regarding executable web
content raised in this thesis is that such the execution of such code is largely
transparent to users. These web browser settings can alleviate this concern to some
degree as the browser can be configured to prompt users for decisions regarding the
downloading and execution of ActiveX Controls. Such prompting can however be
seen by users as an annoyance, particularly as some websites might contain a nwnber
of ActiveX Controls, which would each prompt the user for a decision.
Zones can be configured to allow or disallow the downloading of both signed and
unsigned controls, or to prompt the user for a decision. While the presence of such a
signature can provide some degree of trust it does not completely guarantee that a
control is non-malicious and safe for execution.
Another of the ActiveX related settings implemented by Internet Explorer detennines
the behaviour of the browser when confronted with controls that are marks as being
"safe for scripting". This is intended to protect against situation in which an attacker
might use scripts to control existing ActiveX controls and use them in a hostile
manner. In this type of attack, the control itself is not malicious, although the
attacker tries to use the control in a manner that is. By being marked as safe for
scripting, the control is effectively claiming that it cannot be exploited in this

fashion.

The "Safe for Scripting" security setting offered by Internet Explorer
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governs whether such controls are initialised automatically, prevented from
initialising or whether a user prompt is issued.
There are also a number of settings that govern the way in which Internet Explorer
interacts with its Java Virtual Machine (JVM). A number of pre-defined security
levels can be invoked for Java Applets, or settings can be customised. As the JVM
has the ability to restrict code once it has begun execution, the list of custom settings

offered by Internet Explorer are quite extensive when compared to the settings
controlling ActiveX Controls.

The browser can work in conjunction with the

underlying JVM in order to control capabilities of Java Applets, whereas with
ActiveX controls the decisions revolve around deciding whether or not a control
should allowed to begin execution.
While the ability to classify web pages and sites and configure a rnnge of security
settings is a positive attribute of the Internet Explorer browser, the effective of such
an approach does rely heavily on its configuration. An administration kit from
Microsoft is available which allows administrators to configure these settings across
a range of individual installations in a consistent manner. More detail regarding
Internet Explorers Zone Settings can be found in Appendix C.

6.2.3. Third Party, Internet Explorer Based Browsers
There are a number of web browsers based on Microsoft's web browser engine that
forms the basis of Internet Explorer. The majority of such browsers offer identical
security features to Internet Explorer and will not be discussed in detail in this thesis.
Some of these browsers do differ slightly in terms of cookie handling and other such
functionality and there is the possibility that such browsers may have design flaws,
implementation flaws and other vulnerabilities not found in Internet Explorer.
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However it is not the intention of this thesis to ex.amine Internet Explorer based
browsers in detail.

6.2.4. Netscape/Mozilla
Despite the early popularity of the Netscape web browser, Microsoft's Internet
Explorer currently enjoys dominance on Windows platfonns (BrowserNews, 2002;
NUA Internet Surveys, 2002). However browsers other than Internet Explorer are
used on Windows platforms.

It is important to note that current versions of the Netscape browser are actually
based on the Mozilla Web browser. As a result Netscape versions 6.0 and higher are
quite different to earlier version of Netscape. This thesis will discuss Netscape and
Mozilla as being essentially one product.

Netscape and Mozilla are available for several platfonns including Windows,
Macintosh and Linux. Mozilla does support Java, although it does not natively
support ActiveX Controls. However plug-ins did exist that allowed earlier versions
of Netscape to use ActiveX Controls. These plug-ins also work with Mozilla and
another project to add ActiveX Support to the browser (albeit in a rather limited

fashion) is currently underway (Lock, 2002).
As a result of Mozilla's lack of integrated ActiveX Control support, the browser's
executable web content security is largely limited to sandbox restrictions enforce by
the Java Virtual Machine. The browser does have an option to enable or disable
JavaScript and there are some cookie management features. While the concept of
Internet Explorer-like zones is not as important in a browser like Mozilla that does
not support ActiveX, the lack of such features does limit the user's control of
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JavaScripts. The ability to enable or disable JavaScript on a site-by-site basis would
be a welcome addition.

6.2.5. Opera
Opera is another alternative to the Internet Explorer browser. Like Mozilla, Opera is
available for a number of platforms including Windows, Macintosh and Linux. As a
result of this cross platform nature, Opera also does not support ActiveX Controls.
Hence executable web content security is largely enforced by the Java sandbox. The
browser provides simple options for enabling and disabling Java and JavaScript. As
with Mozilla, this approach lacks the fine grained control of web elements such as
JavaScripts that can be achieved through the use of Internet Explorer's Zones.

6.3. Operating System Issues
This section will endeavour to highlight the importance of operating system level
controls when dealing with executable web content. This thesis presents the view
that operating system level controls are an important part of a layered defence when
dealing with possibly malicious executable web content technologies, although they
do not provide a complete solution to the problems raised.
This thesis will demonstrate that operating system level controls alone do not address
the problems associated with malicious code, as there is not one standard set of
security functionality that is provided by all operating systems that might encounter
such code. The controls offered by Windows NT/2000/XP are very different to those
offered by Windows 95/98/98SE/ME.

These are quite different again when

compared to Unix and Linux machines and Macintosh systems. As these operating
systems do not implement a standard set of security features there is most definitely a
role to be played by executable web content technologies themselves.
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This chapter will focus on Windows NT/2000/XP and examine the security controls
that are provided by this family of operating systems. A more detailed discussion of
this family of operating systems can be found in Appendix D.

6.3.1. File Permissions
Unlike operating systems such as Windows 95/98/ME, Windows NT/2000/XP

provides quite robust file permission functionality. Such functionality is available
when the NTFS file system is used.
File permissions prevent users from interfering with files owned by other users.
Under the Windows NT/2000/XP architecture, executable web content executes with

the security context of the current user. Therefore file permissions could be used to
prevent malicious code executed by one user form interfering with the files

belonging to another user. However such controls would not prevent the malicious
code from interfering with files owned by the current user. As such, some benefit
may be gained may be gained from the use of file permissions when multiple users
have files on the client machine or network shares accessible on the client machine.
This assumes that the NTFS file system is used and that file pennissions have been
set. There is little protection to be gained from operating system level controls on
files belonging to the current user as any malicious code would be executed with the
permissions and privileges associated with that user.

6.3.2. Cryptographic Separation
Windows 2000 and Windows XP offer an encrypted file system that can be used to
encrypt files. Tiris prevents information being disclosed in the event of the theft of a
hard disk, or by the attacker booting another operating system and using tools such as
NTFSDos to gain read access to NTFS volumes. However such measures would be
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ineffective against malicious code such as ActiveX Controls as such code would
execute with the pennissions of the current user. This user would be able to decrypt
file from the file system. In this sense, a transparent, encrypted file system such as
the one offered by Windows 2000 and XP will provide no more protection than that
provided by file pennission mechanisms. Malicious ActiveX Controls would not be
able to decrypt files belonging to other users, however file pennissions could also be
used to restrict such access.

6.3.3. Logging and auditing
Windows NT, 2000 and XP provide the ability to log a range of different events,
including file accesses and uses of certain pri'Vileges. Three main logs are managed
by these operating systems; a system log, an application log, and a security log.

6.3.4. Logging ActiveX Controls
Operating Systems such as Windows NT/2000/XP provide important logging and
auditing featmes. These features can be used to record file accesses, successful and
unsuccessful uses of privileges as well as errors and warnings. This auditing is
performed by Security Reference Monitor and the Local Security Authority
components (See Section 13.6, in appendix D).

Windows 95/98/ME does not

include such functionality.
The addition and removal of ActiveX Controls could be logged by auditing accesses
to

the

HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT

key

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/Software/Classes/CLSID key.

or

the

However, pjven the

large number of keys placed under these keys, such auditing may impose a
significant perfonnance overhead.
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Some utilities are available that allow users to view registered ActiveX Controls
including

the

OLEView

tool

from

(http://www.microsoft.com/Com/resources/oleview.asp#OLEViewer).

Microsoft
However,

due to the extensive use of OLE and COM technology within the Windows family of
operating systems, many such tools display large numbers of objects, many of which
are operating system components rather than installed web content.
It would be advantageous to be able to record the addition and removal of executable
web content, in particular ActiveX Controls, in an Internet specific log. While
logging and auditing are largely re-active measures, such a log would be a welcome

addition.

6.4. Third Party Tools
While it is important to consider controls implemented by executable web content
technologies themselves as well a,s operating system level controls, third party tools
can also play an important role in protecting against malicious executable web
content. This section will examine the role of tools such as personal :firewalls and
web content filters.

6.4. 1. Anti-Malware Tools
Of all the types of third party security tools mentioned in this section, Anti-virus
tools are probably the most well known. However this thesis will use the term AntiMalware software to describe such products in order to reflect the fact that modem
anti-virus software protects against more than just viruses. Such products typically
provide protection against, viruses, Trojans, wonns and in some cases malicious web
content in the form of Java applets and ActiveX Controls.
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6.4.2. Personal Firewalls
Personal Firewalls are similar to network firewalls in that they can apply filtering to
network communications. However, personal firewalls are software products that

operate on client machines. Some personal firewalls, including Norton Personal

Firewall and Outpost can be used to filter out Java applets and ActiveX Controls, or
at least prompt users for decisions as to whether or not these types of code should be
allowed to begin execution.

It is important to note that ActiveX Controls in particular execute within the same

process as the web browser that is hosting it. While many personal firewalls apply
controls on an application~hy~application basis, a malicious ActiveX Control acting

within the process of a web browser, would appear to that personal firewall to be the
web browser itself. As such, users may elect to trust the web browser, yet malicious
code in the form of an ActiveX Control could exploit this trust and perfonn
malicious actions.

6.4.3. Web Content Filters
Web content filtering tools can be used to guard against malicious executable web
content as well as for a range of other purposes. Among other things, web content
filters can be used to filter out Java applets and Active Controls.

Some tools

implement lists of trusted an un-trusted sites and allow a policy to be implemented

accordingly. Such a policy might include the filtering of Java applets and ActiveX
Controls.
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Some tools such as Naviscope (2001) and Web-washer (2002) operate as personal
proxy servers. Like their more fully fledged relatives, personal proxies operate as
intennediaries between web clients and web servers.

However, personal proxy

servers reside on the same machine as the web client.

The use of such trusted and un-trusted lists is similar to the concept of zones
implemented in Internet Explorer. Effective use of such zones in Internet Explorer

would render such third party proxies redundant. However, such tools can be useful
when browsers without the functionality of Internet Explorer's zones are used. Such
proxies can also be useful when multiple browsers are installed on the one machine.

A personal proxy server could be used to apply a consistent executable web content
policy despite a particular user's choice of browser.

6.4.4. Cryptographic Tools
Third party cryptographic tools could provide some protection for sensitive files
from malicious web content. Unlike a transparent, encrypted file system, the use of
third party software to manually encrypt and decrypt sensitive files could prevent
theft of information by code such as malicious ActiveX Controls.

6.5. Summary
This chapter examines the role of web browser, operating system and third party
tools in protecting against malicious web content such as Java applets and ActiveX
Controls. While these layers of protection are significant and play an important role,
they do not diminish the need for controls to be implemented by the technologies
themselves. Technologies such as Java may be used across a range of platfonns,
operating systems and web browsers. While ActiveX Controls are more Windows
oriented, they can also be used across a range of web browsers and Windows
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Platforms. In both cases there may be a very wide range of third party security tools
in use.
This chapter highlights one of the main distinctions between Java and ActiveX
ActiveX's reliance on code signing and lack of sandbox-like run-time environment
increases the reliance of users on browser, OS and third party level controls.
However as such code executes within the security context of the current user, files
and other resources belong to that user may by at risk.
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7. Comparison and Evaluation of Security
Architectures
I
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7.1. Overview
Technologies such as Java and ActiveX fill a similar niche. They both provide a

mechanism whereby web developers can extend the capabilities of web pages and

work around limitations of HTML. While this is not the only application of these
technologies, it is one area where there is a definite overlap between the two.
It is true that both Java and ActiveX have a very different design philosophy, security

architecture and method of implementation, however comparisons between the two
are inevitable. The terms Java and ActiveX are often used in the same context.
Where people refer to one, they often make mention of the other. When Antivirus

software provides functionality to verify one it usually does so for the other as well.
When a personal firewall allows the blocking of one it usually does so for the other
as well.
Titls chapter compares, contrasts and comments on the security architectures, models
and implementations of these two technologies. In particular, it pays attention to the
very different approaches to issues of security offered by the two technologies. It
contrasts the sandbox approach of java, with ActiveX's reliance of code signing.

7.2. Evolution Vs Revolution
Previous chapters have made mention of the design philosophies behind Java and
ActiveX and the origins of both of these technologies. ActiveX is the result of an
evolutionary process that began with VBX controls and OLE objects. While existing
languages influenced the design of the Java language, it was the result of a specific
design process rather than an evolution from previous products.
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llrls allowed the designers of the Java language to consider code security as one of
the major design goals of the language. While other issues such as portability and
robustness were also important design considerations, it was quite unusual for a
security model such as the one implemented by Java, to be considered at such an
early stage of development and so tightly integrated into the language. In contrast,
ActiveX evolved from an environment in which code integrity and security was not
such an important issue.

7.3. Security Models Vs Trust Models
As mentioned in previous chapters, Java employs a highly integrated security model
that encompasses both authentication and authorisation. In the later versions of the
Java language, authentication can be achieved tluough the use of digital signatures
and authorisation can be enforced by the Java sandbox.

In contrast, Acfr,,eX relies on verification of integrity and authenticity through code
signing. ActiveX lacks any method to enforce controls over what a control can do
once it has been allowed to begin execution. Operating system controls can offer
some protection particularly when multiple users share the same machine and
controls are enforced via file permissions. As the ActiveX control operates within
the security context of the user that launched the browser. Additionally, third party
products such as encryption tools may offer some protection against theft of
information attacks that could be performed using ActiveX controls.

However the

fact that ActiveX teclmology does not provided any integrated mechanism to control
the activity of controls is a major concern.

It could be argued that stand-alone executables do not provide an in-built security
model and that therefore this omission is from ActiveX technology is not an
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important issue. However this thesis argues that executable web content is designed
to integrate seamlessly with web pages and is often quite transparent to users. This
removes the need for a user to consciously and explicitly, seek out, download and
execute code (which could possibly be malicious in nature). As a result, this thesis
argues that there is some responsibility for executable web content technologies to
implement controls that can restrict the actions of a piece of code. Java makes a
well-intentioned, reasonable attempt to provide such a mechanism through is
sandbox approach. ActiveX makes no such attempt.
While Java's sandbox approach does attempt to provide a safe, restricted run-time
environment for executable web content, its developers have, in the past, struggled to
defme the boundaries of this environment.

As mentioned in previous chapters,

Java's security model has undergone significant changes. The initial release of the
Java language saw a largely all-or-nothing security model under which all local Java
applications were completely trusted an allowed to operate without restriction
whereas remote applets were subject to significant sandbox restrictions. Since this

initial release there has been a distinct move away from this all-or-nothing approach,
to a more fine-grained, policy driven arrangement.

The latest versions of the

language allow sandbox restrictioos to be tailored for specific applets based on a

security policy.
While the developers of the Java laogoage should be commended for firstly
desigoing the language with a tightly integrated security model and then for refining
this model, there are concerns that the policy driven approach may be self~efeating

in its complexity. Referring to the policy driven approach of Java 2, Schneier (2000,
pl 67) states ''This works much better, but has proven too complicated to use".
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Commentators such as Bruce Schneier (2002b) have raised a number of concerns
regarding code signing as a means of protection against malicious code. Schneier
(2002b) cautions, "Remember, digital signatlll'es provide accountability, not
protection." and also makes the point that "Code signing can't protect you if you can't
figure out whom to trust".

7.4. Implementation Issues, Bugs and Vulnerabilities
This is one area of concern, particularly with the Java language. As noted earlier,
there are a number of Java Virtual Machine implementations from many vendors.
While all of these implementations should confonn to the Java specifications, it is
reasonable to expect that there will be a number of vulnerabilities that could

potentially be exploited.
Not surprisingly, since the release of the Java language in 1995, a number of
significant vulnerabilities have been found.

Sun Microsystems maintains a

chronological list of such bugs (Sun Microsystems, 2002). Examining this list tends
to emphasise the fact that different implementations will have different

vulnerabilities and flaws.
The most recent example documented on this list describes a possible attack to
escalate the privileges of a piece of Java code by exploiting a vulnerability in the
Bytecode Verifier of the Java Sandbox. However privilege escalation attacks are not

the only type of problem documents. Attacks against confidentiality and availability
of infonnation and systems can also be found in this list.
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7.5. Executable Web Content Security
In a paper titled A Comparison between Java and ActiveX Security, Hopwood
(1997) asks

thC question "Would ActiveX or Java be secure if all

implementation

bugs were fixed?" While the security architecture of Java in particular has changed

significantly since Hopwood wrote this paper, it remains an interesting CJ.uestion as it
highlights the differences between the design philosophy a'nd security architectures

of the two technologi_es.

7.6. Summary
TIIis chapter compares and contrasts the approaches taken by the developers of the
Java and ActiveX technologies. It builds on previous chapters and argues the merits
and weaknesses of the approaches taken by these technologies to the difficult task of

executable web content security.
This thesis argues that there are inherent risks involved with the principle of
attaching executable code to web pages in such a way that they download and

execute transparently on client systems. It is therefore important to address these
issues and consider the security models implemented· by technologies such as. Java

and ActiveX.
This chapter argues that the approach taken by the Java language at least attempts to
address the inherent risks associated with executable web content, while ActiveX's·
reliance on digital signatures does little to address these concerns.
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8. Research Questions
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8.1. Overview
This chapter provides answers to the research questions identified in Chapter 2. It
provides and analysis of chapters· present~ in this thCsis and aims. to provide clear,
concise answers to these questions.

8.2. Does executable WWW content pose a significant
se1curity threat to client machines?
This thesis argues that there are inherent risks associated with the use of executable
web content technologies -such as Java and ActiveX. Security problems associated
with untrusted, potentially malicious code have been well documented over a number

of years. However with most fonns of executable code, there is a conscious decision
on the part of users to first seek out, download and then execute the code. This is not
the case with code embedded in web pages.

Web users will not necessarily be aware that a web pagC contains executabte·code
before visiting that page. This, combined with the fact that such code could be
downloaded and executed in a largely transparent manner, removes much of the

decision making from the user.

8.3. Do the security mechanisms offered by these
technologies provide a suitable level of protection?
Both of the major forms of executable web content discussed in this thesis implement
some form of security or trust mechanisms. However there are stark _differences
between the approaches taken by Java and ActiveX.
Java's sandbox approach acknowledges some the concerns raised by the use of
executable web content by providing a mechanism with which to restrict the
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capability of a piece of code. This sandbox approach has a number of positive
attributes.

Java has been designed as an architectlll'e neutral language. It is intended that applets
can be written once and then executed on a number of very different platforms. The
Java Virtual· Machine is the cornerstone of Java ·portability: As ~uch, it would be
inappropriate for the Java language to rely on operating system or other platfonn
specific controls.

The large variation in security controls offered by various

operating systems necessitates a security model that is integrated into the language
itself.
In contrast ActiveX is limited to Windows platfonns.

Despite this, ActiveX

technology cannot rely on a certain set of operating system security featlll'es being
present The Windows 9x product line and the Windows NT/2000/XP line provide a
very different set of security functionality. As such the ActiveX technology can not
rely on the presence of certain OS level controls. For this reason, this th-esis argues
that ActiveX provides insufficient protect against the threats raise by the use of such
code.

8.4. Are there significant differences in the security

mechanisms provided by popular WWW browsers?
The significance of this question has changed somewhat during the writing of this
-thesis. The current dominance of Microsoft's Internet Explorer web browser has
reduced the importance of this question as it is written. However the issue of web
browser security mechanisms is still an important one.

Internet Explorer's concept of security_ zones is an.important step. This feature does
allow the implementation of a security policy in that web sites can be classified and
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that application level controls can be applied depending upon this classification.
When Internet Explorer initially introduced the Security Zone functionality, its main
competitors did not have any equivalent features.
There are some significant differences in the executable web content security.
functionality provided by the current popular browsers. This is to be expected as
there are some quite fundamental differences in terms of the types of executabl~· web
content supported by such browsers. Internet Explorer's support for ActiveX does
necessitate the concept of zones that is supported by the browser.. Browser's such as
Mozilla and Opera that do not support ActiveX (natively) can afford to rely on the
security features offerCd by the Java sandbox approach for executable web content
security. However, In~et Explorers Zones concept spread beyond ActiveX and
allows users increased control over scripts and cookies.
The use of third party tools can play an important role in enforcing a consistent
executable web content policy across a number. of web browsers. Tools such as
privacy enhancing proxy servers can be useful when multiple web browsers are
present on one machine. B}' using tools such as these personal proxy servers, users
can enforce a consistent policy regarding executable_ web content such as Java and
ActiveX and scripts, as well as cookies and banner advertisements, ·regardless of. the
security features provided by web browsers.

8.5. Are there significant benefits to be gained from
using secure desktop operating systems in
conjunction with WWW applications?
This thesis argues that operating system level controls are an important factor when
considering executable web content technologies. However as stated earlier, it is the
position of this thesis that operating system level controls ori their own are not
81

sufficient, rather that they play an important role in terms of defence in depth. As
argued eai-lier, technologies such as Java and ActiveX cannot assume that a certain
set of Operating system level .controls·.will be present. -Active~ controls,. while
largely limited to the Windows platform could be expected to exec~te On Windows
9x systems or Windows NT/2000/XP s~ms. Tb~ situation is_: more complex·in
terms of Java applets; which could be expected -to. operate . on Windows and
Macintosh systems, as well as Linux and Unix variants.
ActiveX's reliance on digital signatures and assurances of aUthenticity and integrity
result in a strong need for operating system level controls. As ActiveX controls
operate in-process with respect to the web browser used, they operate with the same
permissions as the user of the operating system. As such, when multiPle users share
systems, operating system level permissions are .necessary to separate resources
belonging to these users. While a. malicious ActiveX cOntrol may be able to affect
the resources to which the particular,user has access, it should not be able to. affect
objects belonging to other users.
Systems such as Windows 9x machines are more problematic as far. as ActiveX
controls are concerned. A lack of strong operating ·system level resource permissions
means that if allowed to begin execution, a control will effectively have unrestricted
access to all of the resources available on that m~hine.' In··colltr~ Java applets
would still be confined by the restrictive run-time environment of the Java Sandbox.
It is the position of this thesis that operating system level controls are of great
importance when considering the possibility of malicious executable web cOntent,
but as part of a defence in def)th approach. This ·thesis contends that COntrols ~
necessary at the level of the technology itself, as we,11 as the op~ting system level.
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The controls implemented by the technologies themselves are often closely
integrated .with the application level controls such as Internet Explorer's se·curity
Zone concept.

8.6. Summary
This chapter. examines re-visits the research questions identified in Chapter 2.
Perhaps this chapter should close with a statement made by Bruce Schneier (2002a)
"Mobile code is very dangerous, but it's.here to stay. For_mobile code to survive, it
should be redesigned with security as a primary feature."
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9. Conclusions and Future Research
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9.1. Overview
This chapter provides some concluding remarks and suggests possible areas for

future research. A number of such areas were identified during the preparation of
this thesis. Some of these areas are quite closely related to issues discussed in this
document, but were considered to fall outside the scope of this thesis. Other topics
such as peer-to-peer networking have been suggested as areas of future research due
to their sudden prominence and widespread use. Given the sudden surge in use of

peer-to-peer technologies, it will become increasingly important to be aware of the
security issues surrounding their use.

9.2. Conclusions
This thesis has examined issues surrounding the use of executable web content and
has examined the possibilities for malicious code to be delivered in this manner. In
particular it has focused on Sun Microsystems' Java Programming Language and

Microsoft's ActiveX Control Technology.
The general conclusions reached by this investigation are that there are significant
risks inherent with the concept of attaching binary, executable code to web page in

such a way that the code is automatically downloaded and executed when the web
page is rendered within a browser.
The dangers of running code from untrusted sources have been well documented
over a number of years. 1broughout the last two decades in particular, the vectors
for attack by fonns of malicious code have mirrored the prevailing methods of code

distribution. In the 1980s and early 1990s, file infecting and boot sector viruses were
common.

This mirrored the fact that code executable code was commonly
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distributed between users via floppy disks. During the mid to late 1990s, email
became a major vector for malicious code attacks. Often this involved documents
infected with macro viruses. Again, this mirrored the fact that email had become one
of the major ways in which executable code was distributed.

Technologies such as Java and ActiveX represent another method for distributing
executable code. This thesis takes the view that the distribution of such code via web
pages represents another mode of executable code distribution and has the potential
to become a major vector for malicious code attacks.

Technologies such as Java and ActiveX increase the possibility· that users will
execute code from untrusted sources.

However, it is not entirely practical to

advocate that such technologies are not used. Users tend to expect a certain amount
of functionality from web pages and many services rely on embedded code. Internet
banking and similar services often make use of these sorts of technologies. Simply
advising web users to tum off Java and ActiveX is becoming less and less practical
as more service begin to rely on such technologies. As a result it is important to
understand the features and limitations of the security measures offered by such
technologies.

This thesis takes the view that the security model offered by the Java Programming
Language is a positive aspect of the language. The Java security model does not
make any assumptions about the security capabilities of the underlying system and

this tends to reflect the portable nature of the language.
In contrast, this thesis also talces the view that ActiveX's reliance on authenticity,
integrity and non-repudiation through digital signatures raises some concerns. Once
an ActiveX Control is allowed to begin execution it is only really constrained by
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operating system and third party controls.

Given that the capabilities of such

operating system and third party controls can vary from system to system, the
effectiveness of this approach can vary dramatically.

This thesis contends that when considering the issue of executable· web content, a
layered defence must be employed. The first layer in series of defences should be
available at the level of the technology itself. Java's sandbox model is an important
step in this direction. Conversely, this thesis has some concerns over ActiveX's
reliance on digital signatures.

Application level defences comprise the next layer in this series of defences. This
thesis has examined the security mechanisms of several popular web browsers,
including Internet Explorer, Netscape, Mozilla and Opera. It must be noted that this
thesis has limited its examination of these browsers to the principles behind the
secwity mechanisms implemented by these products, particularly as they relate to
executable web content. It is acknowledged that many vulnerabilities have been and
will continue to be discovered in various browsers.

While many of these

vulnerabilities could result in significant security breaches, a discussion of individual
vulnerabilities is well beyond the scope of this thesis.

This thesis takes the view that flexibly policy based approaches such as that offered
by the concept of Zones in the Internet Explorer range of web browsers is a positive
step, even though this approach cannot restrain the actions of an ActiveX Control
once it has begun execution.

Aside from web browsers themselves, application level controls might also include a
nwnber of third products such file encryption tools, personal firewalls, anti-malware
as well as auditing and logging tools.
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Finally, operating system level controls are also of great importance. 'This is one
area that varies considerably between systems. For example, systems employing the
Windows 98 operating system, will provide very different functionality to. those
employing the Linux, or Windows NT/2000/XP. This thesis conteods that while
operating system level controls are an important aspect of executable web content
security, the variation in functionality offered by client operating systems indicates
that other levels of controls will also be of great importance.

Finally, while they are outside the scope of this thesis, this author acknowledges the
importance of non-technical measures such as education and awareness of end users
as well as a solid policy framework, in which these users make use of World Wide
Web resources.

9.3. Future Research
During the preparation of this thesis, it became clear that there are a number of
World Wide Web and other Internet related security issues that that need attention. It
was unfortunate that many of these issues fell outside the scope of this thesis and
could not be discussed.

The following section suggests some areas that deserve

some attention and could be grounds for future research.

9.3.1. World Wide Web Privacy Issues
Issues such as the privacy implications raised by cookies, banner advertisements, and
other profiling mechanisms and the effectiveness of controls such as third party
filtering products could be an interesting area for exploration
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9.3.2. Peer-to-Peer Security Issues
The growing popularity of peer-to-peer (P2P) networking giVes rise to some

important security concerns. Notable examples of peer-to-peer n~tworking include
the controversial Napster (www.napster.com) application and the Gnutella protocol
and related applications (www.limewire.com; www.bearshare.com). Other current

examples include Morpheus, Kazaa .and Grokster.
There are a nwnber of questions that are raised by the use of such technologies.

Some of these questions include:
•

Is the idea oflarge numbers of uncontrolled peer nodes sharing many forms of data and
software fundamentally dangerous?

•

Are there weaknesses in current protocols?

•

How can the protocols be improved?

•

Are there weaknesses in current applications?

•

How can these applications be improved?

•

Will peer-to-peer networking be a major source of attacks and intrusion attempts?

•

How can peers be authenticated? Do we want peers to be positively identified or will
peers prefer to remain anonymous?

•

How will peer-to-peer change views on issues such as copyright and intellectual
property?

•

Will technologies such as watermarking and digital rights management be effective?

•

What are the legal challenges involved?

•

Will peer-to-peer have adverse effects on the perfonnance and reliability of networks?

9.3.3. Microsoft's .Net Framework
Microsoft's .Net framework could also be an interesting area for future research.
Microsoft touts this framework as being the next major paradigm in distributed
systems, in some cases comparing it to the Enterprise Editions of Java 2 (Microsoft,
2002b). An examination of the security issues raised by such technologies and
appropriate- security measures could an interesting extension to some of the aspects
covered in this thesis.
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9.4. Summary
This chapter has presented the conclusions of this thesis as well as suggested some of
the areas that fell outside the scope of this thesis as ,possible avenues for future
research.
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10. Appendix A: Asymmetric Encryption
and Digital Signatures
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10.1. Overview
Digital signature technologies use asymmetric encryption techniques in order to
provide a level of trust when dealing with digital communications. As the name

suggests, there are some distinct similarities between a digital signature and a
handwritten signature on a physical document.
Trust is a difficult issue when dealing with an electronic medium such as the World
Wide Web. It is often seen as a barrier preventing the widespread adoption of

electronic commerce. Digital signatures can alleviate some of these problems as they
can be used to authenticate various parties in a transaction and prove the integrity of
digital documents.

However, aside from their usefulness in terms of electronic

commerce, digital signatures can also benefit other WWW users by providing a trust
mechanism for use with executable code.
This section will begin by highlighting the importance of trust, particularly in

relation to electronic commerce. However, as this thesis is primarily concerned with
the risks associated with executable web content, the discussion will shift to the code
signing applications of digital signature technologies,
Currently, several digital signature technologies exist, marh\ed and supported by a

variety of vendors. Thi.s section will simply discuss the basic concepts behind digital
signature technology.

10.1.1. Digital Signatures and Electronic Commerce
Security is often seen as a significant barrier restricting the widespread adoption of
electronic commerce (Margherio et al., 1998) (Electronic Commerce Expert Group,
1998). Given these concerns over security, trust becomes an important issue (IBM,
1998). In an electronic environment, it can be difficult to be sure that the parties
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involved in a transaction are who they claim to be and transactions and
communications have not been intercepted or fabricated (IBM, 1998).
Digital signature technologies aim to prove the authenticity and integrity of message
or transaction (Feghhi, Feghhi & Williams, 1999, p 45). The ability to reliably
assess the origin and integrity of a digital communication goes a long way towards
providing a level of trust suitable for use with electronic commerce. While decisions
regarding the trustworthiness of a digital message ultimately rely on human
judgement, technologies such as digital signatures aim to improve our ability to make
these decisions.

Digital signatures are one tool to help users make infom1ed

decisions in an electronic environment (IBM 1998).
Whlle digital signatures have the potential to play an important role in the context of
electronic commerce, they can also be used to indicate trust with regard to executable
program code. When used in this manner, these signatures can act as "digital shrinkwrap".

10.2. Code Signing - The "Digital Shrink-Wrap"
Concept
Several conunentators have used analogies comparing digitally signed program code
with shrink-wrapped software purchased through retail outlets (Microsoft, 1996a)
(Microsoft, 1996b) (Feghhi, Feghhi & Williams, 1999, p 99) (Garfinkel & Spafford,
1997, p169). The phrase "digital shrink-wrap" suggests similarities between signed
program code and physically packaged software.

When software is purchased

through a retailer, there are a number of factors that indicate the authenticity of the
product Shrink-wrapping, although hardly foolproof, provides some indication that
the product has not been tampered with since its release. The presence of authentic
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manuals and anti-piracy features such as holograms also suggest that a piece of

software is authentic (Garfinkel & Spafford, 1997, pl69). The appearance of the
retail outlet and the reputation of the merchant can also help consumers make a
decision as to the trustworthiness of the software.
When software is obtained from an electronic source such as the World Wide Web,
indicators of trust are often not present or are not verifiable. Whereas in the physical
world, a retail outlet may consist of bricks and mortar, the digital equivalent is often
a website. Given the ease with which web sites can be created, copied and modified,
it can be very difficult to establish a level of trust. Electronically obtained software
usually lacks indicators such as physical manuals and anti-piracy features. There is
often nothing to indicate the source of the software or anything to prove that the
software has not been modified since its release (Feghhi, Feghhi & Williams, 1999, p
99). The absence of physical trust indicators necessitates other means of establishing
the·authenticity and integrity of a piece of software.
Code signing technologies attempt to positively identify the author of a piece of code
and to prove that the code has not been tampered with since its release (Feghhi,

Feghhi & Williams, 1999, p 99). As this provides sintilar indicators of authenticity as
with physically purchased software, the tenn "digital shrink-wrap" is particularly apt.
Additionally, if a piece of code can be shown to be malicious, positive identification
of the author may make it possible for the victim to seek legal redress. Without the
accowitability offered by code signing technologies, publishers of a piece of
malicious code may deny creating the software, or may claim that it had been

modified since its release (Feghhi, Feghhi & Williams, 1999, p 100).
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Code signing technologies have been enabled by the development of certain
technologies and infrastructure.

In order to sign code, asymmetric encryption

techniques are used. In order to make this signature a meaningful way of generating
trust and accountability, certificates and certificate authorities become necessary.

This chapter will discuss these enabling technologies and infrastructure.

10.3. Asymmetric Encryption
Digital signatures and code signing technologies have been made possible largely

because of the development of public key cryptography. The defining characteristic
of this type on encryption is its use of two keys. Also referred to as asymmetric
encryption, public key encryption uses different keys for encryption and decryption.
Although this fonn of encryption requires both a public key and a secret private key,
it is referred to as public key encryption rather than secret or private key encryption
so as not to cause confusion with other techniques (Feghhi, Feghhi & Williams,

1999, p 36).
In order to use public key encryption, users generate two keys. One of which must
be kept secret, while the other can be freely transmitted. When encrypting a message
such as an email or a piece of text, a user must perfonn the encryption using the
public key of the intended recipient. Only the holder of the corresponding private
key can then decrypt the message. When used to digitally sign a document or
message, the private key is used to create a signature, which can then be verified
using the corresponding public key.

Simply using public key encryption to sign a digital object does not guarantee that
the object is trustworthy. All that a digital signature guarantees is that the object was
signed with a private key that corresponds to the public key used for verification. If
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the recipient of the object does not know or trust the sender, then the fact that the
object is signed is effectively meaningless. Anyone could conceivably create a key
pair and sign a digital object.
One solution to this problem is though the use of certificates. Certificates allow a
trusted third party to vouch for the credentials of the certificate holder.

10.4. Certificates
Public key encryption itself does not guarantee that a digital object comes from a
reputable source. Anyone, regardless of his or her intentions, could generate a key
pair, distribute a public key and use asymmetric encryption techniques in order to
gain trust. For this reason, in order to be meaningful, digital signatures usually
include a certificate from a trusted third party. In effect, the trusted third party
vouches for the identity of the certificate holder.
A digital certificate (or a digital ID or simpiy a certificate) binds inforniation
identifying an entity with a public key (Feghhi, Feghhi & Williams, 1999, p 61).
Without such a binding, digital signatures are of little use and "the key is just a byte
string and can be yours as well as anyone else's." (Gerek, 1998).

One common certificate format is X.509. X.509 is a standard developed by the
International Teleconamunication Union (ITU) (http://www.itu.int/home/) and the
International Standards Organization (ISO) (http://www.iso.ch).

The general

structure of and X.509 certificate can be seen in Figure 5.
Certificates are issued, maintained and revoked by trusted third parties.

These

usually take the fonn of Certificate Authorities (CAs).
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10.5. Certificate Authorities
Certificate Authorities (CAs) act as trusted third parties in order to vouch for the
identity of various clients. Each CA is expected to publish a document describing
the organisation's Certification Practice Statements (CPS).

Certificate Authorities perform a range of duties. While these duties vary between
CAs there are some basic responsibilities that are common to all. Microsoft (MSDN
CDROM) describes some of the duties performed by CAs as;
•

They publish the criteria for granting certificates.

•

They grant certificates if an applicant meets the published criteria.

•

Managing certificates (enrolling, renewal, and revokation).

•

Storing root keys.

•

Verifying evidence submitted by applicants.

•

Providing tools for enrolment.

•

Accepting the liability associated with these responsibilities.

Version
Serial Number
Algorithm Identifier
Algorithm
Parameters
Issuer

h
I\

Period of Validity
Not Before
Date
Subject
Subject's Public Key
Algorithm
Parameters

'"
II

Pu

Signature

Figure S: X.509 Certificate Structure (Microsoft Corporation, n.d)
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10.6. Legal Issues and Challenges
While digital certificates and signatures provide a useful trust mechanism, they do
not guarantee that a message is accurate or that a piece of code is free of malicious
intent. Code signing teclmologies do however attempt to prove authorship of a

particular piece of program code. Such proof of authorship may, in the event that a
piece of program code is found to be intentionally hannful, allow victims to take
legal action against the author.

However given the electronic nature of these

technologies and the global nature of the Internet, seeking legal redress based on

digital signatures gives rise to a number of issues.
Given the current level of interest in electronic commerce it is not surprising that
much has been written regarding the legal issues involved with the using digital

signatures for commercial reasons. Many of the same issues apply when considering
the use of digital signatures code signing purposes.
One major issue revolves around the legal standing of a digital signature compared
with that of a handwritten signature on a legal document. It can be argued that

electronic signatures can fulfil the characteristics required of a traditional
handwritten signature (McCullagh, Little & Caelli, 1998) and as such, deserve a
similar legal standing.

10.6.1. Legal Standing of Digital Signatures in Australia
In April 1998, the Electronic Commerce Expert Group (ECEG) presented a report
the Commonwealth Attorney General. This report made mention of the fact that "At
present the law in Australia does not generally recognise forms of electronic
signatures which can perfonn the functions of a handwritten signature." (Electronic
Commerce Expert Group, 1998). The report recommends that legislation should be
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put in place that deals with the legal effect of electronic signature and that other
considerations should be left for the market to detennine.

Many of the recommendations of the ECEG's report were based on the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on

Electronic Commerce of 1996 (Electronic Commerce Expert Group, 1998).
The Commonwealth Government later incorporated many of the ECEG report's
recommendations into the Commonwealth Government's Electronic Transactions

Bill 1999.

10.7. Summary
The authenticity of digital communications, transactions and program code is often
very difficult to judge. Digital signatures seek to alleviate this problem by providing
the electronic equivalent of a handwritten signature. Digital signatures have been
enabled largely due to the development of public key cryptography (also referred to
as asyrrunetric encryption). Digital signatures are an important tool in improving the
security of electronic communications and transactions.
Code signing is a variation of digital signature technology. It allows the author of a
piece of program code to prove its origin and to prove that the code has not been
modified since its release. Code signing is often described as the equivalent of
digital shrink-wrap as it aims to provide users with some means to detennine the
trustworthiness of a piece of code.

A signature attached to a piece of code does not positively identify the author, it
simply proves that the code was signed with a particular private key. Certificates are
necessary to attach the identity of the author to a piece of code. These certificates are
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issued, maintained and revoked by certificate authorities that effectively vouch for
the identity of the author.
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11. Appendix B: ActiveX Development
Tools
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Unlike Java, ActiveX is not a language. It is a binary specification and as such any
programming language or tool that can create a binary object that conforms to these
stands can be used to create an ActiveX Control. However, in reality, certain
languages and development tools are better suited to the development of Active
Controls than others. Common development tools include Microsoft Visual C++ and
Visual Basic.
Visual C++ provides a flexible, if somewhat complicated method for creating
ActiveX Controls. When using a C++ environment such as Visual C++, developers
have several methods for creating ActiveX Controls.

Controls can be created

completely by hand, or by using various class libraries or templates.
Controls can be created manually or with the help of an existing framework (Li &,
Economopoulos, 1997, p. 73). While creating controls manually can provide a high
level of flexibility, it can be very a very tedious and inefficient method of control
creation. This approach requires an in depth understanding of the inner workings of
ActiveX Controls and presents a steep learning curve for developers. A much more
effective way to create controls is to use an existing framework such as the Microsoft

Foundation Classes (MFC}, the Abstract Library Templates (ATL) or the BaseCtl
framework.
The BaseCtl framework was developed by Microsoft's Visual Basic Group in 1995
to provide a framework for ActiveX Control (then referred to as CCX) development.
BaseCtl was originally developed to allow the creation of small, lean controls in
order to reduce the loading times for Visual Basic applications.

The major

disadvantage to using BaseCtl is that it is difficult to use and requires developers to
implement much of the control's functionality without a great deal of help from the
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framework (Anderson, 1997, p. 19).

BaseCtl was one of the earliest control

development frameworks and has effectively been superseded by MFC and ATL.
The Microsoft Folllldation Classes (MFC) are a set of C++ classes that can be used
for a wide range of Windows software development projects including the creation
of ActiveX Controls. The use of MFC greatly simplifies the development of controls
compared with creating controls from scratch (Anderson, 1997, p. 143). The use of
MFC still requires a solid understanding of the ActiveX architecture and bas a
considerable learning curve, although this approach is much simpler than developing
controls manually or by using BaseCtl.
Given the number of developers already familiar with MFC, it seems that this would
be an ideal choice for the creation of ActiveX Controls (Li & Economopoulos, 1997,
p. 187). However, there is a significant drawback to using MFC for control creation
and that is that controls created with MFC are often quite inefficient in terms of file
size. While this may not be a significant problem in a high bandwidth intranet
enviromnent, any increase in file size can result in significant download delays
across a low bandwidth network such as the Internet (Li & Economopoulos, 1997, p.

125; Anderson, 1997, p. 210). This increase in file size to due to (often unnecessary)
MFC runtime code that is incorporated into the resulting control.
Microsoft's Abstract Template Libraries (ATL) provide a practical alternative to
MFC for the development of ActiveX Controls. The main strength of ATL is its
ability to create small, lightweight, efficient controls. Unlike MFC, ATL does not
incorporate large amounts of unnecessary code into the finished control. This makes
controls created with ATL well suited to the low bandwidth Internet/WWW
enviromnent. In fact, ATL has been described as a method for generating '1ust
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enough" code to implement the desired control (Li & Economopoulos, 1997, p. 21).
Controls developed with ATL do not rely on specific DLLs or other libraries being
included with the finished control.

It seems likdy that ATL will increasingly

become the framework of choice for ActiveX Control development (Anderson, 1997,
p. 249).

MFC enjoys a high level of integration with Microsoft's Visual C++ development
environment, making it a convenient choice for the rapid development of ActiveX
Controls, particularly where download times are not an important consideration
(A.iderson, 1997, p. 17; Li & Economopoulos, 1997, p. 20). ATL is also integrated
with Visual C++, although no as tightly as MFC (Anderson, 1997, p. 18; Li &

Economopoulos, 1997, p. 21). However, built-in support for ATL within Visual
C++ is increasing with each new version of the language.

This reflects the

importance that Microsoft places in this library. BaseCtl does not have any real
integration with Visual C++ (Anderson, 1997, p. 18) and is not currently considered
a viable alternate for ActiveX Control development.
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12. Appendix C: Internet Explorer Zones
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The following table summarises the differences between the pre-defined security
levels for Microsoft's Internet Explorer Web browser. Each of the four security
zones used by the browser can be configured to use either the High, Medium,
Medium-Low or low security profile listed in the table below. Additionally the
browser allows users to customise these profiles.

Securi Level
Medium-Low

Low

Prooertv

Hi"),

Medium

Download signed ActiveX
controls
Download unsigned ActiveX
controls
Initialise and script ActiveX
controls not marked as safe
Run ActiveX controls and Pug-

Disable

Prompt

Prompt

Enable

Disable

Disable

Disable

Prompt

Disable

Disable

Disable

Prompt

Disable

Enable

Enable

Enable

Script ActiveX controls
marked as safe
Allow Cookies
Allow ner-session cookies
File download
Font download
Java Pennissions

Enable

Enable

Enable

Enable

Disable
Disable
Disable
Promot
High Safety

Enable
Enable
Enable
Enable
High Safety

Enable
Enable
Enable
Enable
Low Safety

Disable

Disable

Enable
Enable
Enable
Enable
Medium
Safetv
Ptompt

Prompt

Enable

Enable

Enable

Disable
Disable

Promot
Prompt

Prompt
Prompt

Enable
Enable

Disable

Enable

Enable

Enable

High Safety

Medium
Safetv
Enable

Low Safety

Prompt

Medium
Safetv
Enable

Disable
Enable
Disable ·

Enable
Enable
Enable

Enable
Enable
Enable

Enable
Enable
Enable

Disable
Prompt for
usemameand
password

Enable
Automatic
logon only in
Intranet zone

Enable
Automatic
logon only in
Intranet zone

Enable
Automatic
logon with
current
usemameand
password

ms

Access data sources across
domains
Drag and drop or copy and
oaste files
Installation of desktop items
Launching programs in an

Enable

!FRAME
Navigate Sub frames across
different domains
Software channel permissions
Submit non-encrypted fonn
data
User data rsistence
Active scrintinl!
Allow paste operations via
scrint
Scrintine of Java Ar1nlets
Logon

Enable
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13. Appendix D: Windows NT/2000/XP
Security Architecture
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This appendix provides information regarding the security architecture of the
Windows NT line of operating systems. This line also includes Windows 200 and
WindowsXP.
Common operating systems, particularly those for WWW clients and servers include

Windows 95/98, Windows NT Server and Workstation, UNIX, Linux and MacOS.

In terms of security features, these operating systems vary greatly. While Unix and
Windows NT offer some important security mechanisms, the security features of

Windows 95/98 are considered minimal.

13.1. Background
Microsoft's Windows Operating System is currently the world's most prolific
desktop operating system (add reference here). However, Windows is not one single
product. Rather the name represents a family of operating systems. Currently the
Windows family contains a number of product lines, primarily Windows

3.1,Windows 95/98, Windows NT/2000 and Windows CE.
This thesis will refer to the Windows 95/98/ME line of Microsoft of operating
systems as Windows9X or Win9X. Architecturally, these operating systems are
quite similar and as such, they will be discussed as if they are essentially one
product. As this thesis focuses on Windows NT and Windows 2000 in detail, it will
refer to products individually despite the fact that there are a number of architectural
similarities.
At a superficial level, there are some distinct similarities between the different
branches of the Windows family. Windows 3.1 and Windows NT 3.5 share a similar
u:1cr interface, as do Windows 95/98 and Windows NT 4.0.

Despite these

similarities, the different Windows product lines were developed with under different
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circmnstances and with different goals.

As a result, there are many important

architectural differences between Windows NT and other member of the Windows

family.

13.2. Characteristics of Windows NT/ 2000
While there are a number of cosmetic similarities between the Win9x and Windows
NT/2000 product lines, there a also a number of important architectural differences.
This is not surprising as both product lines are aimed at different segments of the
Operating System market. Win9x is generally a consumer level operating systems
aimed at home users. In contrast Windows NT and Windows 2000 are aimed at a
nwnber of market segments. There are several variations of Windows NT and
Windows 2000.

There are variations aimed at professional users, designed for

desktop workstations, as well as several variations designed for use as servers. As
this thesis focuses on security threats faced by consumers of World Wide Web
services, it will discuss only the "Professional" versions of Windows NT and
Windows 2000. Others variations of these operating systems, while architecturally
similar, fall outside the scope of this thesis.
In contrast to the Windows 9x line, Windows NT and 2000 were designed to be quite
portable.

Whereas Windows 9x is limited to Intel based platforms, Windows

NT/2000 versions have been released for other platforms. However Intel remains a
popular choice of platform for this operating system. Unlike Win9x, Windows NT
and 2000 make use of a Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL) in order to insulate most
of the Operating System from hardware dependencies introduced by various
platforms. This HAL can be seen in Figure 6.
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While much of Windows9x was written in platfonn dependent assembly code, NT
and 2000 were developed using higher-level languages. The use of higher-level
languages and the inclusion for the HAL makes Windows NT and 2000 much easier
to port to platfonns other than those based on Intel processors.
While Windows 3.1 and Win9x were heavily dependent on the MS-DOS operating
system, Windows NT and 2000 are completely independent of this earlier operating
system. Unlike Windows 3.1, Windows NT and 2000 do not rely on having MSDOS installed and unlike the Win9x line, Windows NT and 2000 do not incorporate
large portions of MS-DOS technology. As such Windows NT and 2000 differ
greatly in tenns of architecture when compared with Win9x.
Robustness, stability and security were also major design goals of Windows NT and
2000. Whereas the security features implemented by Win9x can only be described
as minimal, Windows NT and 2000 do implement some important security features
(Sheldon, 1997, p 76; Rutstein, 1997, p3), many of which will be discussed in this
chapter

13.3. The Windows NT Architecture
Architecturally, WinNT is very different to the Win9x line of operating systems. It
is divided into several distinct subsystems and components. The basic architecture of
the Windows NT can be seen in Figure 6.
One notable architectural feature is that Windows NT draws a clear distinction
between User Mode and Kernel Mode. All user applications execute in User mode
while various system components execute in kernel mode. The intention behind this
division is to ensure that the kernel remains intact and running even if indivi 181

110

applications prove to be unstable. As a result, unstable applications should not affect
the stability of the whole operating system.
As shown in Figwe 6, Windows NT is capable not only of running Win32 based but
also some OS/2 and POSIX applications. Each of these types of applications is
executed via the appropriate subsystem, each of which is executed in user mode.
Figure 6 also shows that some sections of the security subsystem are executed in user
mode while the Security Reference Monitor (discussed later in this chapter) executes
in kernel mode.
Figure 6 also shows the Hardware Abstraction layer (HAL) and its relationship with
other subsystems. As stated previously, this layer insulates much of the Windows
NT Operating System from hardware specific dependencies.

13.4. The Windows NT Security Architecture
Windows NT offers a range of security features that are not available in many
consumer desktop operating systems such as Win9x. The Windows NT security
architecture is based on three key components· the Local Security Authority (LSA),
Security Account Manager (SAM) and the Security Reference Monitor (SRM).
These components are described in depth by a number of authors (Kelley, Mayson,

1997; Sheldon, 1997) and their relationship can be seen in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Windows NT/2000 Architecture

13.5. The Local Security Authority and Logon Process
The heart of the Window NT Security architecture is the Local Security Authority
(LSA), as can be seen in Figure 7. The LSA is responsible for generating access
tokens, managing security policies and controlling the auditing process (Rutstein,
1997, p. 8).

The Logon Process allows both local and remote users to logon to a Windows NT
machine. Once users are successfully logged on, they are identified by a Security
Identifier (SID) and an Access Token. The LSA is responsible for generating access
tokens as users complete the logon process. This token incorporates the SID of the
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user and the Sills of any groups to which the users account belongs. This token is
attached to every process invoked by the user and is used to determine whether a user
should be granted access to a particular object.
The LSA is also responsible for managing audit logs. When the Security Reference
Monitor (see section 13.6) alerts the LSA that an event has occurred that should be
audited, the LSA is responsible for writing that event to the audit logs (Rutstein,
1997, p 8).
The LSA's other area of responsibility is in managing the security policy database.

User Mode

Logon
Process

Security
Account

---Account

Manager

Database

User

Audit
---Log

Security

Policy
Database

Kernel Mode
Security

Reference
Monitor

Figure 7: Windows NT Security Architecture

The Security Account Manager (SAM) controls a database of account information.
This database contains information regarding user and group accounts. During the
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logon process, the SAM consults the User Account Database and returns the user's
SID to the LSA (Kelley & Mayson, 1997).
The SAM contains infonnation about user accounts including passwords. In most
cases, Windows NT stores two passwords - a native Windows NT password and a
password for backward compatibility with Microsoft's LAN Manager product line.
Both passwords are encrypted twice using one-way functions before being stored in
the SAM. As one-way functions are used for the two encryption processes, it is
technically very difficult for a plaintext password to be retrieved from its encrypted
form. When password checking is perfonned, the password to be tested is encrypted
using the same one-way functions. ff the resulting encrypted password matches the
one stored in the SAM, then it can be assumed that the password that was entered
was correct.
Much of the information in the SAM is stored in the Windows NT registry
(discussed in section 13.7.3) under the key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SAM. This
registry data is in tom stored in the SAM and SAM.LOG files in the
%SYSTEM_ROOT"/o\SYSTEM32\CONFIG directory (Rutstein, 1997, p 144).

13.6. The Security Reference Monitor
The Security Reference Monitor (SRM) is the only component of the security
subsystem that executes in kernel mode. This module is primarily responsible for
comparing an access token (as generated by the LSA) against the permissions set for
an object and determining the level of access granted, if any.
Objects such as files, threads and registry keys all have an attached Security
Descriptor (SD). This SD includes, among other attributes, the SID of the object's
owner, an Access Control List (ACL) and a system ACL (Sheldon, 1997, p. 86).
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In most cases, the owner of an object is the user that first created the object.

However, in some cases it is possible for other user to talce owner ship of a file.
ACLs are central to Windows NT's object security architecture. ACLs contain zero
or more Access Control Entries (ACEs). Each ACE specifies a SID representing a

user or group and a set of permissions assigned to that SID. The SRM is responsible
for checking a user's access token against the entries in an ACL in order to determine
whether the level of access requested by the user should be granted. The SRM scans
through all of the entries in an ACL and ru:cumulates any access permissions

assigned to the user until the permissions granted match the permissions requested or
the SRM reaches the end of the ACL. In the fonner case the SRM would grant the
user the desired access while in the latter case, access would be denied (Sheldon,
1997, p. 87).

It is possible that an ACE will specifically deny all access to a

particular group or user, in which case this ACE will revoke any permissions granted
by other ACEs in the object's ACL (Sheldon, 1997, p. 88). In effect, access to an

object is denied unless an ACE specifically grants permission. Additionally access is
denied if any ACE denies the user the requested permissions even if another ACE

specifically grants the user these permissions (R.utstein, 1997, p. 12).
When the SRM makes the decision to grant or deny access to an object, it generates
the necessary audit event notification messages and passes them to the LSA, which

in turn adds entries into various audit logs.

13.7. Securing Windows NT
Despite the security features offered by Windows NT, default installations are quite
relaxed in terms of security. Administrators must be careful to properly configure
NT to make full use of its security features.
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When attempting to secme an installation of Windows NT, there are several areas
that need to be considered including users and groups, file systems, registry access,
network configuration, services packs, updates and hotfixes.

13.7.1. Managing User and Group Accounts
Windows NT allows for the creation of user and group accollllts. In most cases,
users will have their own individual accounts. These accollllts can belong to
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more groups and each group can contain any number of user accollllts. Groups can
simplify the process of assigning access rights and privileges to users. Instead of
assigning rights and privileges to each individual account, they can be assigned to
groups and then inherited by the members of these groups.
Administrators can create, modify and delete accounts and groups. In addition,
Windows NT provides several in~built groups and accounts some of which deserve
special attention as they have significant implications for the security of Windows
NT systems. These include the Everyone group and the Administrator and Guest
Accounts.
The Everyone Group includes every user that accesses a Windows NT System
(Rutstein, 1997, p37). In fact it is impcssible tc create a user account that is not a
member of the Everyone group. By default, Windows NT assigns the Everyone
group several permissions including; full control over new file shares, the ability to
change pennissions on the root directories of any NTFS partition and the ability to
change the pennlssions of the System32 directory (Sheldon, 1997, p. 181). This is
one example of how Windows NT security relies on careful configuration by
administrators. The default security settings in this area do not lend themselves to
the creation of a secure environment straight "out of the box". While in most cases it
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is a simple task for administrators to take such permissions away from the Everyone
group, this issue illustrates the importance of proper configuration rather than relying
on default security settings.
There are also certain issues surrounding the use of the administrator and guest
accounts.

Due to the powerful nature of the Administrator account, it is

recommended that administrators create their own personal accounts for day-to-day
work such as word processing and Internet access. In contrast, the administrator
account should only be used for administrative duties.

Given the pennissions

associated with the Administrator account, any malicious code executed by some
using the administrator would have largely unrestricted access to a Windows NT
system. This is not a new concept, nor is it restricted to Windows NT. It is
considered good practice when using any operating system that allows different users
to be awarded different levels of permissions to not use highly privileged accounts
for mundane duties.
The in-built Guest account also deserves special consideration. The guest account
allows users without and existing account to logon on to a Windows NT machine,
albeit with very minimal permissions. In most cases, users will not even need a
password in order to logon as a guest The Guest account is a member of the Guests
group and also the Everyone system group. As the Guest account is member of the
Everyone group, by default it will have access to shared directories, unless
permissions for the Everyone group are specifically revoked.

In addition, any

number of users may share one guest account and as such, audit logs will not reveal
any infonnation about any particular guest account user (Sheldon, 1997, p. 98). In
versions prior to Windows NT 4.0, the guest account was enabled by defauh. This
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was changed with the release of Windows NT 4.0. The guest account is now
disabled by default and if needed, must be specifically re-enabled.

13.7.2. File System Security
Windows NT variants prior to version 4.0 allowed the use of three distinct file
systems - File Allocation Table (FAT), High Perfonnance File System (HPFS) and
New Technology File System (NTFS). Windows NT 4.0 only supports the use of
FAT and NTFS, and as such, this section will only discuss these two file systems.
FAT is the file system made popular by the MS-DOS operating system and Windows
95/98. While it can be used with Windows NT, it offers no advantages in tenns of
security and will not be discussed here in depth. NTFS is the "Native" file system of
Windows NT and offers several security advantages over other file systems.
The advantages of using the NTFS file system include speed improvements, reduced
file fragmentation, small cluster sizes to reduce waste, file and directory compression
(Kelley, Mayson, 1997). In addition, NTFS is the only file system that allows
administrators to make use of the file pennission mechanisms offered by Windows
NT (Rutstein, 1997, p. 66).
Having the choice of two file systems also raises several issues. As the FAT file
system caa be used by both Windows 95/98 and Windows NT, there is a risk that
FAT volwnes my be accessed by operating systems other than Windows NT. Even
though file pennissions cannot be set on FAT volumes, in most cases users will still
need to log Windows NT using a defined account in order to access files. However,
this can easily be bypassed by installing another operating system on the machine
such as Windows 95/98 or MS-DOS.
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As NTFS cannot be used by Windows 95/98, any volumes fonnatted with this file

system will be invisible to users not using Windows NT. While it is true to say that
Windows 95/98 cannot access NTFS volumes natively, utilities such NTFSDOS can
give operating systems such as Windows 95/98 read-only access to any NTFS

volumes on a particular machine. This has significant implications for Windows NT
file system security as security mechanisms such as the logon process and file system
permissions can be bypassed simply by booting a machine with an operating system
such as Windows 95/98 or MS-DOS, running NTFSDos and copying sensitive files
over to FAT based hard disk or removable media. As Windows NT is not even

running, the Security Reference Monitor cannot prevent access to such sensitive files
and the LSA cannot audit the file access. Third party encryption tools can provide
some protection against this type of situation. Physically securing Windows NT
machines must also be an important consideration.
Unlike the FAT file system, NTFS allows files to be owned by particular users or
groups. It also allows the setting of access permissions on files and directories and
offers provisions for auditing file accesses.
File system security is quite relaxed in a default installation of Windows NT,
particularly for the Workstation version.

It is the system administrator's

responsibility to ensure that, where required, file system security features are used.
When created, files give access to the Everyone group and as a result any other user
would have access to this file. It is the responsibility of the creator of the file and
system administrators to ensure that appropriate access restrictions are placed on the
file
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However, file system security can be a complex issue. While file ownership and
access may be quite straightforward when dealing with user's documents such as
word processing and spreadsheet files, it can be difficult to assign pennissions to
certain system files. Not specifying permissions on such files may have certain
security implications, while restricting access too tightly may interfere with the
nonnal operation of a particular system. Some authors including Sheldon (1997)
describe some of the default pennissions on key system files and make some
suggestions as to how pennissions may be set safely.

13.7.3. Registry Security
Both the Windows 95/98 and Windows NT product lines make use of a centralised
database to store various users, hardware and configuration settings. Not only does it
govern the behaviour of hardware and application software, but also the operating
system itself. As a result, measures should be taken to guard against accidental or

deliberate tampering.
The Windows NT registry is a structured hierarchy of hives, keys, sub-keys, values
and data and is similar in structure, but not identical to the Windows 95/98 registry.
The top level of the Windows NT registry is divided into five major groupings
referred to as hives. These hives can be seen in Table 2. These hives are in tum
divided into a number of keys and sub-keys.

Hive

IIKEY_CLASSES_ROOT

Descriotion
Contains infonnation about registered software
components including COM/OLE and ActiveX

Controls.
IIKEY_CURRENT_USER
IIKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE

Contains information regarding the user that is
currentlv }onned on.
Contains information regarding the local Windows
NT machine. It includes information about drivers,
installed hardware and software, svstem
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confim1mtion and securirv settine:s.
Contains infonnation about all users of the local
machine.
IIKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG Contains
information
about
the
current
confiunm,tion of the local machine.
HKEY_USERS

Table 2: Windows NT Regsitry Structure (Rutstein, 1997, p. 143)

Given the wealth of infonnation stored in the Windows NT registry, it should be
obvious that some measures will be need to prevent accidental or malicious
modification of registry infonnation (Rutstein, 1997, p144). To further complicate
matters, users may attempt to modify registry settings remotely on any Windows NT
machine on which the user has an account. User may also try to connect to a
machine using a guest account in order to perform remote registry modifications
(Rutstein, 1997, pl44).
The Windows NT registry can be secured in a similar manner to an NTFS file system
volume. Permissions can be added to keys in much the same way as they can be
added to files and directories. However tie same difficulties remain. As with file
system pennissions, it can be very difficult to detennine the level of permissions that
should be assigned to certain keys. Some keys are relied upon by the Windows NT
System and/or user application. Placing tight restrictions on these keys may prevent
the system or applications from perfonnin&.properly. In contrast, lax permissions
may adversely affect the security of a system. The sheer number of keys in the
registry and the importance of this database to a Windows NT system can make the
setting of permissions a difficult task.

A number of authors present guidelines

suggesting permissions that can be applied to certain registry keys (Sheldon, 1997,
p.627; Rutstein, 1997, p.148; Jumes, Cooper, Chamoun& Feinman, 1999, p. 191).
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in addition to setting registry pennissions, access to registry keys can also be audited.
However given the sheer number of keys in the Windows NT registry, the addition of
auditing infonnation can greatly increase the overall size of the registry. In addition,
perfonnance overheads involved with auditing may be significant if a large number
of keys are to be audited.

13.7.4. Network Security
As this thesis is mainly concerned with security issues that affect Windows NT
platfonns as Internet and World Wide Web clients, Windows Networking security
will not be discussed here in detail.

13.7.5. Service Packs, Patches and Hotfixes
Since the release of Windows NT 4.0 in 1996, Microsoft has released a number of
official updates in the form of service packs, patches and Hotfixes. It is important
for administrators to be aware of the latest official updates and the issues that they
address. Currently six service packs have been released for Windows NT 4.0.

13.8. Summary
Microsoft Windows NT and 2000 are members of a larger family of Microsoft
operating systems. This thesis focuses on the Windows NT/2000 variants that are
designed to be used on workstations and desktop machines. These operating systems
were chosen due to the fact that they implement a number of important security
features and are commonly used on WWW client machines.

This chapter describes the security features and architecture of Windows NT/2000.
Later chapters will build on this discussion and argue the advantages and
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disadvantages of operating system level controls in tenns of reducing risks posed by
WWW usage.
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